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Antitrust Victims Without Antitrust Remedies:
The Narrowing of Standing in Private Antitrust
Actions
C. Douglas Floyd*
If we should free ourselves from the miasma of adjectives that have
accumulated around the words of § 4, this case would seem to be a
paradigmof standing.
-Judge Henry J. Friendly'

INTRODUCTION
Section 4 of the Clayton Act authorizes "[alny person...
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws" to recover treble damages and their
costs of suit.2 In a series of important decisions,3 the Supreme
Court has interpreted section 4 more narrowly than its language would suggest, stating that "there is a point beyond
which the wrongdoer should not be held liable," 4 and "it is reasonable to assume that Congress did not intend to allow every
person tangentially affected by an antitrust violation to maintain an action to recover
threefold damages for the injury to his
5
business or property."

*
Professor of Law, Brigham Young University Law School. The author
gratefully acknowledges the comments and suggestions of Professor Joseph F.
Brodley and Dean E. Thomas Sullivan.
1. Crimpers Promotions Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 724 F.2d 290, 297
(2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).
3. See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334
(1990); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 112-13 (1986); Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters (AGCC), 459 U.S. 519, 537 (1983); Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457
U.S. 465,477-78 (1982); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S.
477, 489 (1977).
4. Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 477 (1982) (citing Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 760 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
5. Id.
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In view of the countless "ripples of harm" that antitrust
violations may have in the economy, the necessity for some
limitation on the literal reach of section 4 is self-evident.6 The
principles that should guide that limitation, however, are less
apparent and have not been fully resolved by the Supreme
Court. Some lower federal courts have distilled from the Supreme Court's opinions the governing principle that standing
under section 4 should be limited, either absolutely or presumptively, to consumers or competitors adversely affected by
the defendant's anticompetitive conduct.' Even in decisions
that have not expressly adopted a consumer or competitor limitation on standing, a plaintiffs status as a nonconsumer and
noncompetitor has been a major factor leading to the denial of
standing in private antitrust actions.'
There is, however, a
9
conflict of authority on the issue.
6. Id. at 476-77.
7. For cases limiting standing absolutely to competitors and consumers,
see Serfecz v. Jewel Food Stores, 67 F.3d 591, 597 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 1042 (1996); Bell v. Dow Chemical Co., 847 F.2d 1179, 1183 (5th
Cir. 1988); Eagle v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc., 812 F.2d 538, 540 (9th Cir. 1987);
General Indus. Corp. v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 810 F.2d 795, 809 (8th Cir.
1987); In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litig. (Bichan), 681 F.2d 514, 515 (7th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, Bichan v. Chemetron, 460 U.S. 1016 (1983). For an
example of presumptive limitation on standing to consumers or competitors,
see SAS of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 48 F.3d 39, 44-45 (1st Cir.
1995).
8. See International Raw Materials, Ltd. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 978 F.2d
1318, 1328-29 (3d Cir. 1992) (denying standing to a soda ash operator to challenge an export company's immunity under the Webb-Pomerone Act because
the terminal operator was neither a consumer nor a competitor in the sale of
soda ash), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 988 (1993); Apperson v. Fleet Carrier Corp.,
879 F.2d 1344, 1352 (6th Cir. 1989) (denying standing to union automobile
transportation employees to challenge an increased handling charge that affected their compensation), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947 (1990); South Dakota v.
Kansas City Southern Indus., Inc., 880 F.2d 40, 49 (8th Cir. 1989) (denying
standing to state to contest the allegedly monopolistic practices of railroad
companies that hindered the construction of a coal pipeline), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1023 (1990); R.C. Dick Geothermal Corp. v. Thermogenics, Inc., 890 F.2d
139, 152 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (denying standing to a lessor to challenge an
alleged conspiracy among lessees and others to suppress the development of
geothermal steam); Gregory Mktg. Corp. v. Wakefern Food Corp., 787 F.2d 92,
98 (3d Cir. 1986) (denying standing to an employee who was fired for refusing
to implement a discriminatory price discount to a preferred buyer), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 821 (1986); Province v. Cleveland Press Publ'g Co., 787 F.2d
1047, 1054 (6th Cir. 1986) (denying standing to newspaper employees who alleged a monopolistic conspiracy between rival newspaper owners that affected
wage and employment terms); Exhibitors' Serv., Inc. v. American MultiCinema, Inc., 788 F.2d 574, 581 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that motion picture
licensing agent fired as part of an agreement between two competing exhibit-
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In considering the appropriateness of this restrictive antitrust standing principle, consider the plaintiffs in the following
cases:

1. Plaintiffs, the organizers of a trade show promoting direct
contacts between producers of cable television programming and local cable television stations, allege that
HBO and Showtime, to protect their business of selling
programming to the stations, conspired to organize a
boycott of the plaintiffs' show.1"
2. Plaintiffs, "cost consultants" for the buyers of yellow
pages advertising, allege that defendant sellers of yellow
pages advertising refused to do business with advertisers
using the plaintiffs' services in order to prevent the
plaintiffs from negotiating reductions of the defendants'
monopolistic and discriminatory prices.11
3. Plaintiffs, union employees, allege that their employer
and their international union conspired to depress
wages in the labor market for the purpose of effectuating a
primary conspiracy to monopolize the market for the
12
construction of nuclear power plants.
4. Plaintiff, an apple juice distributor, claims that it was
terminated by defendant apple juice manufacturer because
the plaintiff refused to implement the manufacturer's discriminatory discount for a preferred buyer. 3
ing companies to lower prices paid for first-run film rights lacked standing to
challenge the agreement); Lucas v. Bechtel Corp., 800 F.2d 839, 846 (9th Cir.
1986) (finding that electrical union employees lacked standing to challenge an
allegedly monopolistic practice to depress electrician's wages and thereby control the market for constructing nuclear power plants); Henke Enterprise, Inc.
v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., 749 F.2d 488, 490 (8th Cir. 1984) (denying
standing to a tenant affected by the grocery store anchor tenant's decision to
relocate while refusing to permit another grocery store to become the anchor);
Southaven Land Co. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 715 F.2d 1079, 1088 (6th Cir.
1983) (denying standing to the lessor of commercial property who alleged that
the defendant refused to sublease the property for use as a grocery store).
9. See Sullivan v. Tagliabue, 25 F.3d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 1994) (The circuits
are split.., over the question of whether a plaintiff must be either a consumer or competitor in the market harmed by the antitrust violation at issue
in order to establish antitrust injury.").
10. See Crimpers Promotions Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 724 F.2d 290,
291-92 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied,467 U.S. 1252 (1984).
11. See Yellow Pages Cost Consultants, Inc. v. GTE Directories Corp., 951
F.2d 1158, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 913 (1992).
12. See Lucas v. Bechtel Corp., 800 F.2d 839, 840-42 (9th Cir. 1986); see
also Sacramento Valley Chapter of the Nat. Elec. Contractors Assn. v. International Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, 888 F.2d 604, 605-06 (9th Cir. 1989).
13. See Gregory Mktg. Corp. v. Wakefern Food Corp., 787 F.2d 92, 92-93
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5. Plaintiff, manager of the defendant's industrial gas division, claims that he was fired because he refused to
gas producparticipate in an illegal conspiracy among
4
ers to fix prices and allocate customers.1
Each of these cases involves a direct victim who was not, or
at least arguably was not, 5 a consumer or competitor in the
markets restrained by the defendanits' conduct. In each case,
the defendant targeted the intermediary for boycott, termination,
or other injury as a means of implementing an allegedly anticompetitive scheme. In each case, a principle limiting standing
to consumers or competitors in the markets restrained by the
defendants' conduct would deny standing to the plaintiffs.
In the first two cases standing was upheld 6 on the dubious
theory that the plaintiff, even though it operated as an agent of
the purchasers of advertising, was a "competitor" of the sellers
of advertising. 7 In the other three cases standing was denied." However, in the last example, a conflicting and much
criticized
case would grant standing to the terminated em9
ployee.'
Is there a principled basis for interpreting the broad language
of section 4 of the Clayton Act to permit suit only by consumers or
competitors in the markets restrained by the defendants anti(3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 821 (1986).
14. See In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litig. (Bichan), 681 F.2d 514, 515
(7th Cir. 1982, cert. denied, Bichan v, Chemetron, 460 U.S. 1016 (1983).
15. The Yellow Pages court based its decision in part on the questionable
assertion that the plaintiff could be viewed as a competitor of GTE in the sale
of yellow-pages advertising. See Yellow Pages Cost Consultants, 951 F.2d at
1161 (stating plaintiff offered evidence showing their services were considered
better than, but not different from GTE's services). See infra notes 240-243
and accompanying text (arguing that the Yellow Pages court stretched the
facts to conclude that plaintiff was a competitor).
16. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text. (discussing these two
cases).
17. See Yellow Page Cost Consultants, 951 F.2d at 1161; see also infra
notes 240-243 and accompanying text (discussing other grounds for recognizing standing beyond the consumer-competitor classification).
18. See supra 12-14 notes and accompanying text (discussing these cases).
19. See Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., Inc., 670 F.2d 1378, 1380-81 (9th Cir.
1982), vacated and remanded,460 U.S. 1007 (1983), on remand, 740 F.2d 739
(9th Cir. 1984), cert. dismissed, 469 U.S. 1200 (1985). But see Gregory Mktg.
Corp. v. Wakefern Food Corp., 787 F.2d 92, 96 (listing cases criticizing the Ostrofe rationale). In Vinci v. Waste Management, Inc., 80 F.3d 1372, 1376-1377
(9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1252 (1997), a panel of the Ninth Circuit narrowly limited Ostrofe to cases in which the employee's participation
was "essential" to the implementation of the defendant~s anticompetitive
scheme.
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competitive actions, excluding the direct victims of the defendant's conduct whose injuries were the instrument by which its
anticompetitive ends were achieved? Should the standing of
some intermediary victims who are targeted as a means of
achieving the defendant's anticompetitive objectives be upheld?
If so, should the standing of the plaintiffs in all, or only some,
of the illustrative cases be recognized? On what ground, if any,
can the plaintiffs in the last three cases be distinguished from
those in the first two? And if there is no principled distinction,
should standing be denied in all or recognized in all?
This Article attempts to provide a framework for answering
these questions. Underlying them all is an even more basic inquiry, however, not adequately addressed in previous treatments of the subject. Is it appropriate for the judiciary to
screen out private antitrust plaintiffs who fall squarely within
the language of section 4 because other plaintiffs, on policy
grounds, appear to be "better" antitrust plaintiffs? For example, one modern policy-based approach to antitrust standing
that would screen out not only nonconsumer and noncompetitor plaintiffs, but many consumers and competitors as well,
draws on the economic theory of "optimal deterrence." °
Starting from the premise that the sole object of the antitrust
laws is to promote the economic concept of allocative efficiency,
proponents of this theory have argued that the treble-damages
remedy under section 4 of the Clayton Act should be calibrated
precisely to limit recovery to the sum of the monopoly overcharge plus the "deadweight" welfare loss resulting from the
defendant's violation, divided by the probability that violations
of the kind at issue will be detected.2 1 From this, the proponents reason that standing in antitrust actions should be limited to plaintiffs whose losses are the result of the monopoly
overcharge or deadweight loss inflicted by the defendant.'
This result is said to be required to prevent "overdeterrence" of

20. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by
Targets of Tender Offers, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1156 (1982); William M.
Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CI. L. REV. 652,
656 (1983); William H. Page, The Scope ofLiability for Antitrust Violations, 37
STAN. L. REv. 1445, 1452 (1985).
21. See Landes, supra note 20, at 656-657; Page, supra note 20, at 1455.
22. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 20, at 1160, 1164; Page, supra
note 20, at 1457.
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antitrust violations and to provide an incentive for defendants
to commit "efficient" violations of the antitrust laws.23
There are many difficulties in squaring this approach with
the intent of the Congress that enacted section 4.24 Most importantly, in their zeal to restrict the language of section 4, the
proponents of the optimal economic deterrence theory seem
blind to another very real prospect-underdeterrence. Courts
that restrict the universe of potential plaintiffs to those who
have felt the ultimate price and output effects of the defendant's anticompetitive scheme often screen out those plaintiffs
who were most directly and visibly harmed, who are most
aware of their injuries, and who have the greatest ability and
incentive to sue. This screen assumes, without any empirical
basis, that those who have felt the price-enhancing or outputreducing effects of the defendants' conduct, such as ultimate
consumers, will be fully aware of their injuries, and will have
suffered injury of sufficient magnitude to cause them to sue.
These assumptions are debatable on empirical grounds.25
More importantly, they address the wrong issue. In interpreting
the language of section 4, the question is not what the economic
theory of "optimal deterrence" would suggest, but what Congress
intended when it enacted section 4. Such purely policy-based
approaches to antitrust standing implicitly assume that Congress, in the broad language of section 4, authorized the courts
to define the scope of the treble-damages remedy as a matter of
federal common law. If, on the contrary, that premise is rejected and determining the limits of antitrust standing is
viewed as a matter of statutory interpretation, as this Article
argues it should be, the case for either a consumer-competitor
limitation or an "optimal deterrence" limitation on antitrust
standing is far more tenuous.
A standing principle turning on traditional proximate cause
analysis, which ascribes overriding weight to the directness of
the plaintiffs injuries and their importance to the success of the
defendant's anticompetitive activities, is most consistent with
the language, history, and remedial and deterrent objectives of
23. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 20, at 1157 ("An optimal
schedule of penalties allows 'efficient violations' to take place, while it deters
other violations.").
24. See infra Part V (discussing relation of congressional intent and optimal deterrence theory).
25. See infra notes 218-220 and accompanying text (giving reasons why
groups of plaintiffs may elect not to sue).
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section 4 of the Clayton Act.26 Neither the possible existence of
other "consumer-competitor" plaintiffs who hypothetically
might have elected to sue (but in fact did not) 27 nor the availability of remedies under tort, contract, or other bodies of law
designed to protect different interests28 provides an adequate
basis for denying standing under the antitrust laws to the direct victims of antitrust misconduct.
The reasons advanced here for rejecting a consumer or
competitor limitation on antitrust standing also help to resolve
other recurring and important antitrust standing questions
created by more restrictive approaches. For example, proponents of the "optimal deterrence" theory have argued that,
even though they are consumers or competitors in affected
markets, neither distributors subjected to an unlawful resale
price maintenance scheme nor competitors excluded from the
market by an unlawful tying arrangement should have standing
to sue because they have not directly felt the price and output
effects of the violations alleged.29 In recent decisions, however,
the Supreme Court has continued to recognize the standing of
these victims of antitrust misconduct." Under the analysis
here, that result is correct. Similarly, the suggested approach
explains the weight of authority recognizing the antitrust
standing of cartel members who seek to break ranks, and of the
targets of takeover bids,3 1 despite the contention that they are
the beneficiaries rather than the victims of the cartel or the
merger.
I. ORIGINS OF THE "CONSUMER OR COIPETITOR"
LIMITATION
In Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v.
CaliforniaState Council of Carpenters(AGCC),32 the Supreme
Court's most comprehensive treatment of antitrust standing,

26. See infra Part 11.
27. See infra notes 218-220 and accompanying text (discussing reasons
why consumers or competitors might elect not to sue).
28. See infra Part II.E (discussing the relevance that the availability of
other remedies should have for antitrust standing).
29. See infra notes 293-306 and accompanying text (discussing groups of
plaintiffs who would be excluded by optimal deterrence theory).
30. See infra notes 293-306 and accompanying text (identifying cases in
which the Supreme Court has granted standing).
31. See infra notes 276-285 and accompanying text.
32. 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
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the Court rejected the various "target area," "direct injury,"
and "zone of interests" formulations33 previously employed by
the courts of appeals in favor of a multifactor balancing approach. In AGCC, a union complained that a multiemployer
association and some of its members had conspired to damage
the union by coercing general contractors, others who let construction contracts, and landowners to enter contracts with
non-union firms.34 The Court concluded that the union lacked
standing, primarily because its injuries were indirect and derivative. It stated that standing under section 4 should turn on
a number of factors, including: (1) whether the plaintiff's injury
is of the type Congress sought to redress; (2) whether the defendant intended to harm the plaintiff, (3) the directness or
indirectness of the injury; (4) the existence of other persons
more directly injured who are likely to sue; and (5) whether the
claim involves speculative harm, duplicative recovery, or a
complex apportionment of damages.35
The difficulties of application created by the Court's unstructured, case-specific approach to standing under section 4
are discussed below.3 6 In considering the development of the
emerging tendency to limit standing under section 4 only to
consumers or competitors in the markets affected by the defendant's conduct, however, the most salient portion of the Court's
opinion was that considering the nature of the union's injury.
The Court concluded that the union "was neither a consumer
nor a competitor in the market in which trade was restrained."3" Further, it was not clear that the union's interests
would be benefited by enhanced competition, because its goal of
enhancing union wages and working conditions might be
harmed by free competition among employers striving to reduce costs. Federal law had developed a "broad labor exemption
from the antitrust laws" to protect union interests, and also "a
33. The "target area" test asked whether the plaintiff was within the area
of the economy endangered by a breakdown of competitive conditions caused
by the antitrust violation. The "direct injury" test asked whether the injury
suffered was directly linked to the antitrust violation. The "zone of interests"
test asked whether the injury was arguably intended to be protected by the
antitrust laws. See id. at 536 n.33 (counseling lower courts to analyze standing according to the factors outlined in AGCC in lieu of resorting to any one of
these tests).
34. See id. at 522-23.
35. See id. at 537-43.
36. See discussion infra Parts II.A-B.
37. AGCC, 459 U.S. at 539.
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separate body of labor law specifically designed to protect and
encourage the organizational and representational activities of
labor unions."3 8 Thus, unions "will frequently not be part of the
class the Sherman Act was designed to protect .... -9 In
AGCC, the Court concluded that the union's "labor-market interests" seemed to predominate and consequently held that its
injuries 40
were not of the type that the antitrust laws sought to
prevent.
A number of courts have considered this passage in AGCC
as support for restricting antitrust standing to consumers or
competitors in the markets restrained by a defendant's conduct.4 1 Analyzed in its context, however, it provides only weak
support for the conclusion that nonconsumer and noncompetitor
intermediaries who are directly injured as a means of implementing an anticompetitive scheme should be denied standing
under section 4. In the first place, the Court in AGCC declined
to adopt any rigid, all-encompassing standing rules, preferring
instead to articulate a flexible, case-specific approach. The nature of the plaintiffs injury and the plaintiffs status as a consumer or competitor in the market restrained by the defendant's conduct comprise only two of a number of factors to be
balanced by the court in deciding whether the plaintiffs
standing should be recognized.4 2 Additionally, the Court's discussion of the nature of the union's injury in AGCC was only
preliminary to the major focus of the opinion, namely that the
union lacked standing because its injuries were only indirect
and derivative of those suffered by the coerced landowners and
general contractors, creating the risk of speculative harm,
43
duplicative recovery, and complex apportionment of damages.
To the extent that the Court's analysis turned on the nature of the union's injury in AGCC, moreover, it rested primarily on considerations unique to the labor-antitrust context in
which the case arose, and particularly on the Court's conclusion
that a separate body of labor law protected the interests of the
union, which often would be disserved by the procompetition
policies of the antitrust laws. As discussed below," the Court's
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 539-40.
Id. at 540.
Id.
See supra notes 7-8 (listing courts that have usedAGCC in this manner).
See AGCC, 459 U.S. at 536 n.33.
See id. at 540-44.
See discussion infra Part H.E.
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vague discussion of the relevance of the labor laws, as well as
its suggestion that employees and unions "frequently" will not
be the intended beneficiaries of the antitrust laws, was problematic. It contributed little to the resolution of the standing
issue in AGCC because it was clear that, if the union's allegations were accepted, the union would have benefited from the
elimination of the restraint on the use of union contractors and
subcontractors. In any event, the Court's specific focus on
these unique considerations applicable to unions and their
members has no application to cases in which nonconsumer
and noncompetitor plaintiffs are neither unions nor union
members.
The Supreme Court's decision in Blue Shield of Virginia v.
McCready4 5 also belies reliance on AGCC as support for a consumer-competitor limitation on section 4 standing.
In
McCready, the plaintiff challenged a conspiracy between Blue
Shield and an association of psychiatrists to deny reimbursement for treatment by psychologists unless the services were
billed through and supervised by a physician.4 6 The Court rejected the claim that standing should be limited to the psychologists, who were the targets of the alleged conspiracy. It
held that the broad language of section 4 "cannot reasonably be
restricted to those competitors whom the conspirators hoped to
eliminate from the market."4 7 The plaintiff had standing because denying reimbursement for the costs of treatment was
"the very means by which it is alleged that Blue Shield sought
to achieve its illegal ends"; the plaintiffs harm was foreseeable
and a "necessary step in effecting the ends of the alleged illegal
conspiracy." 48 The Court rejected the argument that the plaintiff lacked standing because she was "not an economic actor in
the market that had been restrained." 49 The McCready court
explicitly stated that section 4 "does not confine its protection
to consumers, or to purchasers, or to competitors, or to sellers.... The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage,
protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices
by whomever they may be perpetrated." 50
45. 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
46. See id. at 468.
47. Id. at 479.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 472 (quoting Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal
Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948)).
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Yet the McCready plaintiff was a consumer of psychotherapy
services. Some courts have relied upon this fact to argue that,
despite the Supreme Court's explicit rejection of a rigid
"market participant" limitation on standing under section 4,
McCready is consistent with a general consumer-competitor
limitation on standing.5' This reading of the Court's opinion is
tenuous. As Justice Rehnquist pointed out in his McCready
dissent, McCready made no claim that the defendants' conduct
had enhanced price or limited output in the restrained market
for psychotherapy services. 52 Therefore, the 3plaintiff had alleged no "anticompetitive effect upon herself."
If a consumer-competitor limitation on antitrust standing
under section 4 is justified, that limitation ultimately must
rest on the theory that, because the consumer welfare objectives of the antitrust laws seek to preserve price and output at
their competitive levels, only those who directly have felt the
price-enhancing or output-restricting effects of the defendant's
conduct should have standing. Had the Court applied this
logic in McCready, the action would have been dismissed because there was no claim that McCready had felt such anticompetitive effects.
The cases reading AGCC as support for a consumer or
competitor limitation on antitrust standing fail to recognize
that the Supreme Court expressly declined to decide that issue
in that case. After observing that the union was neither a consumer nor a competitor in the affected market in AGCC, the
Court stated that "[w]e therefore need not decide whether the
direct victim of a boycott, who suffers a type of injury unrelated
to antitrust policy, may recover damages when the ultimate
purpose of the boycott is to restrain competition in the relevant
economic market."' Thus, the AGCC court reserved decision of
the precise issue presented by the illustrative cases above.
Moreover, in McCready, the Court affirmatively suggested
that a boycotted intermediary who was the means by which the
defendants sought to achieve their anticompetitive ends would
51. See SAS v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 48 F.3d 39, 45-46 (1st Cir. 1995); Exhibitors' Serv., Inc. v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 788 F.2d 574, 579 (9th
Cir. 1986); Gregory Mktg. Corp. v. Wakefern Food Corp., 787 F.2d 92, 95 (3d
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 821 (1986); Henke Enters., Inc. v. Hy-Vee
Food Stores, Inc. 749 F.2d 488, 489 (8th Cir. 1984).
52. See McCready, 457 U.S. at 488.

53. Id. at 489.
54. AGCC, 459 U.S. at 540 n.44.
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have standing even though it was not a consumer or competitor
in the market restrained. The Court hypothesized a case in
which a "group of psychiatrists conspired to boycott a bank
until the bank ceased making loans to psychologists."51 In such
a boycott, "the bank would no doubt be able to recover the injuries suffered as a consequence of the psychiatrists' actions."5 6
The strongest support, both on precedential and theoretical
grounds, for a consumer or competitor limitation on standing in
private antitrust actions comes not from AGCC, but from the
Court's seminal "antitrust injury" decision in Brunswick Corp.
v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. There, the Court denied standing
to a bowling alley owner who challenged the defendant's acquisition of its competitor under section 7 of the Clayton Act.
The plaintiff's theory of recovery was that absent the acquisition, the rival would have gone out of business and the plaintiff
would have enjoyed higher profits.5 8 The Supreme Court held
that the plaintiff was complaining, in effect, that it would be
damaged by increased competition, and that such a claim was
in direct conflict with the purposes of the Sherman and Clayton Acts to promote competition.59 The plaintiff had 'therefore
not suffered "antitrust injury," that is "injury of the type the
antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from
that which makes defendants' acts unlawful." 0 The Court
went on to explain:
[T]he antitrust laws are not merely indifferent to the injury claimed
here. At base, respondents complain that by acquiring the failing
centers petitioner preserved competition, thereby depriving respondents of the benefits of increased concentration.... The antitrust
laws, however, were enacted for the protection of competition, not
competitors.' It is inimical to the purposes61 of these laws to award
damages for the type of injury claimed here.

In language that bears directly on the issue discussed in
this Article, the Brunswick Court added that, to constitute antitrust injury, the plaintiffs injury "should reflect the anticom-

55. McCready, 457 U.S. at 484 n.21.
56. Id.
57. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
58. See id. at 481.
59. See id. at 486.
60. Id. at 489.
61. Id. at 488 (citation omitted) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)).

1997]

ANTITRUST STANDING

or of anticompetitive acts
petitive effect either of the violation
62
violation."
the
by
possible
made
Read narrowly as a holding that the antitrust laws do not
permit a plaintiff to recover damages resulting from continued
or increased competition, the holding of Brunswick is selfevident. Congress, in seeking to promote free competition by
enacting the antitrust laws, could not have meant in section 4
to provide for the recovery of damages resulting from increased
competition. Allowing standing in such cases would not only
violate Congress's intent, but would be directly contrary to the
express language of section 4, which authorizes recovery only
63
for damages which occur "by reason of'an antitrust violation.
Damages resulting from increased competition do not occur "by
reason of' a violation of the antitrust laws.
The Supreme Court's additional gloss on section 4 in
Brunswick, to the effect that a plaintiff has suffered "antitrust
injury" only if the plaintiffs injury "reflect[s] the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts
made possible by the violation," is more problematic.64 Read
literally, this formulation would deny standing to all of the intermediary victims in the illustrative cases on the ground that,
as nonconsumers and noncompetitors in the markets restrained by the defendants' conduct, they have not suffered the
output-restraining or price-enhancing effects that the defendants sought to achieve, and thus have not felt the
"anticompetitive effect" of the violation (or of acts made possible by the violation).
The legitimacy of this interpretation of section 4 is the focus of the balance of this Article. At present it is sufficient to
note that, unlike the core Brunswick principle denying standing to plaintiffs who seek to recover for damages resulting from
increased competition, this broader formulation of the antitrust injury requirement is not obviously compelled by the central procompetition policy of the antitrust laws. In the illustrative cases, the directly targeted victims whose injuries were
the means by which the defendants sought to achieve their anticompetitive ends were not seeking to recover damages resulting from competition, but to recover damages they suffered by
their elimination as an obstacle to the success of defendants'

62. Id at 489.
63. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1994).
64. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489.
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anticompetitive scheme. 65 Further, unlike the core Brunswick
principle prohibiting damages resulting from competition itself, this broader view of the "antitrust injury" component of
section 4 standing analysis has no foundation in, but is contrary to, the explicit language of section 4. In the illustrative
cases, the plaintiffs' injuries occurred "by reason of' a violation
of the antitrust laws because those injuries were the means by
which the violation was committed.
The Court's most recent decisions considering the concept
of "antitrust injury" rest entirely on the core holding of Brunswick prohibiting recovery for damages resulting from increased
competition. They thus provide no support for a consumercompetitor limitation on standing under section 4. For example, in Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 66 the Court
held that a meat-packing company could not enjoin a merger of
its competitors. The Court held that to the extent the plaintiff
alleged that it was threatened with injury as a result of lower,
but nonpredatory prices, it was in effect complaining of increased competition resulting from the merger and therefore
lacked standing under Brunswick. "Brunswick holds that the
antitrust laws do not require the courts to protect small businesses from the loss of profits due to continued competition,
but only against the loss of profits from practices forbidden by
the antitrust laws."67 The Court stated that the plaintiff would
have standing if it could allege a legitimate threat of predatory
pricing, but that it had failed to raise that claim in the trial
court.6 8

In its most recent decision considering the antitrust injury
requirement, Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co.,69 the
Court held that a competing independent distributor lacked
standing to challenge an alleged maximum resale price maintenance scheme that ARCO had imposed on its dealers because
the distributor was not a dealer whose prices had been restrained. To the extent that the price ceiling resulted in lower
but nonpredatory prices, the plaintiff, as in Brunswick and
Cargill,was complaining of increased competition." ° Although
the plaintiff may have lost business as a result, its injuries did
65. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
66. 479 U.S. 104 (1986).

67. Id. at 116.
68. See id. at 117-19.
69. 495 U.S. 328 (1990).
70. See id. at 338.
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not "flow from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful"
and were not "attributable to [the] anti-competitive aspect of
the practice under scrutiny."71 "Antitrust injury does not arise
for purposes of section 4 of the Clayton Act... until a private
party is adversely affected by an anticompetitive aspect of the
[In the context of pricing practices,
defendant's conduct ....
only 72predatory pricing has the requisite anticompetitive effect."
Cargill and Atlantic Richfield show that even competitors
in the markets restrained by a defendant's anticompetitive
conduct lack standing where their injuries are the result of increased rather than reduced competition on the merits. They
do not address the standing of nonconsumer and noncompetitor plaintiffs such as those in the illustrative cases, but are
consistent with the recognition of standing in such cases. In
the intermediary cases, the plaintiffs' injuries do not flow from
increased competition, but are the means by which the defendant seeks to achieve its anticompetitive ends. Those injuries
can thus be argued to "flow from" and be "attributable to" the
unlawful aspect of the practice under scrutiny. The plaintiffs
in Cargill and Atlantic Richfield were not "adversely affected
by an anticompetitive aspect of the defendant's conduct"73 because their injuries were not the means by which the defendant sought to achieve its anticompetitive ends. For the same
reason, the prevention of the plaintiffs' injuries in the illustrative cases is directly "linked"74 to the procompetition policy of
the antitrust laws, as section 4 requires.
II. THE ABSENCE OF A PRINCIPLED BASIS FOR
LIM[TING ANTITRUST STANDING TO CONSUMERS
OR COMPETITORS IN THE AFFECTED MARKETS
A. STATUTORY TEXT

In recent years, the Supreme Court has stated repeatedly
that the starting point in interpreting any statute is the language of the statute itself.75 Departures from the statutory text

71. Id. at 334.
72. Id. at 339 (citations omitted).
73. Id74. See Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465,482 (1982).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 356 (1994);
Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 873 (1991); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
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are permitted only in cases of ambiguity or where the application of unambiguous statutory language would produce an
"absurd result."76 The Court's emphasis on these principles of
statutory interpretation reflects a determination that any
other approach would involve an unwarranted danger of judicial encroachment on the legislative sphere, and of giving legal
effect to aspects of legislative history never enacted into law.7
A consumer-competitor limitation on antitrust standing
draws no support from the text of section 4 of the Clayton Act,
which broadly provides that "any person" injured by reason of
an antitrust violation may recover the damages they have sustained.7" Indeed, the Supreme Court has observed that '"[o]n79
its face, § 4 contains little in the way of restrictive language,'"
and that a "literal reading of the statute is broad enough to encompass every harm that can be attributed directly or indirectly to the consequences of an antitrust violation."8 0 Any
limit on standing under section 4 must therefore be grounded
in a principle other than the "plain meaning" of the statutory
text.
B.

DELEGATION TO THE JUDICIARY

A judicially created consumer or competitor limitation on
the unrestricted language of section 4 could perhaps be justified if Congress, in the Sherman and Clayton Acts, had delegated to the judiciary the power to define those injured in their
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
76. See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 68-70
(1994); West Virginia Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98 (1991); cf.
Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 409 (1993) (noting that finding a clear expression of congressional intent ends the process of statutory
construction); Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475
(1991) (stating that the clear language of a statute ordinarily guides its interpretation); Freytag,501 U.S. 868 at 873 (same).
77. See Casey, 499 U.S. at 100-01; Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc.,
458 U.S. 564, 575 (1982); Estate of Cowart, 505 U.S. at 475-78.
78. Section 4 of the Clayton Act reads, in relevant part:
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in
any district court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the
amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by
him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorneys fee.
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).
79. Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982) (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 337 (1979)).
80. AGCC, 459 U.S. 519, 529 (1983).
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business or property "by reason of' a violation of the antitrust
laws as a matter of federal common law.81 Some support for
that position might be found in the longstanding recognition
that Congress expected the judiciary to flesh out the broad
substantive prohibitions of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act
in the "common-law tradition." 2 In Texas Industries, Inc. v.
RadcliffMaterials,Inc.,81 however, the Supreme Court declined
to find an analogous delegation to the judiciary to fashion a
federal common law of antitrust remedies. Rejecting a claim
that it should recognize a right of contribution among antitrust
violators in that case, the Court contrasted the relatively undefined substantive prohibitions of the Sherman Act with their
detailed and specific remedial provisions.' With respect to the
latter, "[t]he intent to allow courts to develop governing principles of law, so unmistakably clear with regard to substantive
violations, does not appear in debates on the treble-damages
action created in Section 7 of the original Act."8 5 In the absence
of such a delegation, or any other basis for creating antitrust
remedies as a matter of federal common law, the role of the
judiciary was limited to "identify[ing] the scope of the remedy
Congress itself has provided."86 The Court stated, "In almost
any statutory scheme, there may be a need for judicial interpretation of ambiguous or incomplete provisions. But the
authority to construe a statute is fundamentally different from
a new remedy
the authority to fashion a new rule or to provide
87
which Congress has decided not to adopt."
To be sure, the issue in Texas Industries and the question
here are not identical. The issue in Texas Industries was
whether the Court should extend the range of private remedies
that Congress expressly had provided by permitting a suit for
contribution that did not fall even arguably within the lan-

81. See, e.g., Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630,
642-43 (1981) (holding that although Congress intended the courts to give
meaning to the substantive violations of the Sherman Act, Congress did not
delegate to the judiciary the authority to fashion remedies).
82. National Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688
(1978).
83. 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
84. See id. at 644-645.
85. Id. at 643-644 (citing C. Douglas Floyd, ContributionAmong Antitrust
Violators:A Questionof Legal Process, 1980 BYU. L. REV. 183, 228).
86. 451 U.S. at 646 (citing Floyd, supra note 85, at 227-31).
87. Id. at 646 (quoting Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers
Union, 451 U.S. 77,97 (1981)).
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guage of section 4. The question at hand is whether the judiciary should limit the sweep of section 4 to less than its literal
scope. Nevertheless, the thrust of the Court's analysis in Texas
Industries is directly on point. Neither section 4 of the Clayton
Act nor any other provision of the antitrust laws delegates to
the judiciary the power to fashion a federal common law of private remedies for their enforcement. Regardless of policy considerations that might lead a court, acting in its "legislative"
capacity in creating federal common law, to limit the private
antitrust remedy only to consumers or competitors in the markets affected by the defendants' conduct,88 the judiciary's
proper role is more limited. It is simply, and only, to interpret
the scope of the remedy that Congress has provided, drawing
on any relevant aids to statutory interpretation, including the
language, purpose, and history of the statute, and any relevant
background principles of the common law against which Congress may be assumed to have legislated when it passed the
Sherman Act in 1890 and the Clayton Act in 1914.
C.

BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES OF PROXIMATE CAUSE

Despite its frequent admonition that "[t]he starting point
in interpreting a statute is its language,"8 9 the Court has
sometimes been persuaded to depart from the literal text of a
statute. This has occurred when the Court was convinced that
Congress acted in light of a well established "background
principle" of the common law to which it assumed the courts
would adhere in their application of a broadly phrased statutory text.9"
88. The appropriateness of such a limitation as a matter of federal common law is hardly self-evident. Cf Joseph F. Brodley, Antitrust Standing in
Private Merger Cases: Reconciling PrivateIncentives and PublicEnforcement
Goals, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1, 4-9 (1995) (discussing the disagreement among the
federal courts of appeals on the question of antitrust standing).
89. Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 409 (1993); see supra
note 75 (listing cases holding so).
90. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 544-50 (1994)
(holding that in the absence of express statutory guidance, the proper scope of
recovery for negligently inflicted emotional distress under the Federal Employers' Liability Act must be determined by reference to relevant commonlaw principles); Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 (1994) (ruling that
common-law tradition required that scienter be established to convict under
the National Firearms Act even though the word "knowingly" was not found
in the Act); Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108
(1991) ("Congress is understood to legislate against a background of commonlaw adjudicatory principles."); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S.
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In both Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready and Associated General Contractors of California v. California State
Council of Carpenters (AGCC), the Supreme Court explicitly
invoked such a background legal principle in reaching the conclusion that section 4's authorization for the recovery of treble
damages by "any person injured in his business or property" by
reason of an antitrust violation could not be given its literal
scope. In McCready, the Court observed:
In the absence of direct guidance from Congress, and faced with
the claim that a particular injury is too remote from the alleged violation to warrant Section 4 standing, the courts are thus forced to resort to an analysis no less elusive than that employed traditionally by
courts91at common law with respect to the matter of proximate
cause.

In AGCC the Court elaborated on this idea. It first noted
previous decisions suggesting that the section 4 remedy should
be liberally interpreted and applied, and that the comprehensive protection of the statute was not limited to consumers,
competitors, purchasers, or sellers.92 The Court then concluded
that the debates preceding the 1890 enactment of the Sherman
Act made it clear that the remedial as well as the substantive
provisions of the statute should be read against their commonlaw background. 93 "Just as the substantive content of the
Sherman Act draws meaning from its common-law antecedents, so must we consider the contemporary legal context in
which Congress acted when we try to ascertain the intended
scope of the private remedy created by Section 7."94 In particular, in 1890,
a number of judge-made rules circumscribed the availability of damages recoveries in both tort and contract litigation-doctrines such as
foreseeability and proximate cause, directness of injury, certainty of
damages, and privity of contract. Although particular common-law
limitations were not debated in Congress, the frequent references to
common-law principles imply that Congress simply assumed that
antitrust damages litigation would be subject to constraints compa101, 110-11 (1989) (holding that ERISA must be interpreted against a federal
common-law background of trusts); cf. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 116
S. Ct. 1712, 1721-23 (1996) (justifying use of abstention doctrines because of
historic common-law powers of equity); National Private Truck Council, Inc. v.
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 2351, 2354-56 (1995) (concluding that
common-law history of federal deference to state tax administration warranted interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1983 to preclude equitable relief as long as
adequate state-law remedies exist).
91. Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465,477 (1982).
92. See AGCC, 459 U.S. 519, 529 & n.19 (1983).
93. See id. at 531.
94. Id. at 532.
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rable to well-accepted common-law rules applied in comparable itigation.9

In denying standing to the union in AGCC, the Court focused particularly on the common-law tort principle denying
recovery for injuries that are indirect, consequential, and remote, and therefore not "proximately caused" by the conduct of
the defendant.9 6 "There is a similarity between the struggle of
common-law judges to articulate a precise definition of the concept of 'proximate cause,' and the struggle of federal judges to
articulate a precise test to determine whether a party97 injured
by an antitrust violation may recover treble damages."
The Supreme Court reiterated the relevance of the background principle of proximate cause to antitrust standing
analysis in its subsequent RICO98 decision in Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.99 The Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) sought to maintain an action under
RICO to recover for funds it had advanced to reimburse customers of brokerages alleged to have been injured by defendants' fraudulent manipulation of securities held by the brokerages. The Court held that the SIPC lacked standing to
recover under a subrogation theory for the injuries suffered by
the brokerage customers as a result of the insolvency of the
brokerages.' ° The Court observed that RICO's provision for a
private right of action in favor of "any person injured in his
business or property" by a violation of the Act had been modeled after section 4 of the Clayton Act.10 ' It noted that in
AGCC, "we held that a plaintiffs right to sue under Section 4
required a showing that the defendant's violation not only was
a 'but for' cause of his injury, but was the proximate cause as
well." 102 It concluded that "among the many shapes this
[proximate cause] concept took at common law... was a demand for some direct relation between the injury asserted and
the injurious conduct alleged." °3 Applying this analysis, the
95. Id. at 532-33 (footnotes omitted).
96. See id. at 532-534.
97. Id. at 535-36 (footnotes omitted).
98. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 19611968 (1994).
99. 503 U.S. 258 (1992).
100. See id.at 274.
101. See id. at 267.
102. Id. at 268.
103. Id. (citation omitted). The Court observed that direct injury was not
the "sole requirement" of Clayton Act standing, which had also been inter-
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Court denied RICO standing to the SIPC on its subrogation
claims because the injuries to the customers of the brokerages
°4
were only derivative of those to the brokerages themselves.1
Relying explicitly on AGCCs admonition that the tendency of the
law was "not to go beyond the first step,"10 5 the Court held that
"the reasons that supported conforming Clayton Act causation to
[that] general tendency apply just as readily to the present
facts, underscoring the obvious congressional adoption of the
Clayton Act direct-injury limitation" in RICO." 6
The background proximate-cause principle provides ample
support for the federal courts' longstanding rejection of the
standing of corporate shareholders, suppliers, and others suffering only indirect and consequential injuries as the result of
the "ripples of harm" of an antitrust violation.10 7 However, the
proximate cause principle provides little or no support for the
conclusion that even directly injured parties whose injuries are
essential to the success of the defendants' anticompetitive
scheme should be denied standing on the ground that they are
not consumers or competitors in the markets affected by defendants' antitrust violation, and therefore have not felt the priceenhancing or output-reducing effects of the defendants' conduct. The federal courts frequently have analogized antitrust
violations to tortious misconduct"'8 and AGCC's invocation of
the tort concept of proximate cause as a relevant "background
principle" of statutory construction was therefore fully justipreted to require that the plaintiff suffer antitrust injury, but that "it has
been one of its central elements." Id. at 269 n.15.
104. See id. at 271-74.
105. Id. at 271.
106. Id. at 272.
107. For cases dealing with corporate shareholders and/or creditors, see
Vinci v. Waste Management, Inc., 80 F.3d 1372, 1375 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1252 (1996); Peck v. General Motors Corp., 894 F.2d 844, 84647 (6th Cir. 1990); Rand v. Anacanda-Ericsson, Inc., 794 F.2d 843, 849 (2d Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 987 (1986). For cases dealing with suppliers, see
G.K.A. Beverage Corp. v. Honickman, 55 F.3d 762, 766 (2d Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 381 (1995); Arthur S. Langenderfer Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co.,
917 F.2d 1413, 1437-39 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 899 (1991);
South Dakota v. Kansas City S. Indus., 880 F.2d 40, 47-48 (8th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1023 (1989). For a case dealing with employees, see
Sharp v. United Airlines, Inc., 967 F.2d 404 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506
U.S. 974 (1992).
108. For earlier cases in which the Court described violations of antitrust
laws as "tortious acts," see Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251,
263-64 (1946). See also Texas Indus., Inc., v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S.
630, 634 n.5 (1981); Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 363
(9th Cir. 1955).
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fled. If anything, however, tort concepts of proximate cause
would suggest that directly injured parties should have
standing to sue unless, as discussed below, there is some specific evidence of Congressional intent to exclude them from the
private treble-damages remedy.
Initially, as Justice Marshall pointed out in his dissent in
AGCC, one should recognize that the tort concept of proximate
cause finds its primary relevance in limiting the scope of liability for negligent misconduct. 109 Justice Marshall went on to observe, however, that "[a]lthough many legal battles have been
fought over the extent of tort liability for remote consequences
of negligent conduct, it has always been assumed that the victim of an intentional tort can recover from the tortfeasor if he
proves that the tortious conduct was a cause-in-fact of his injuries.""0 Antitrust cases typically involve deliberate acts, not
careless or negligent conduct; the intermediary cases are typically ones in which the defendants have intentionally injured a
person or entity that is neither a consumer nor a competitor in
the markets affected by their conduct in an attempt to achieve
their anticompetitive ends.
The primary function of proximate-cause analysis in negligence cases has been to foreclose recovery for injuries to unforeseeable plaintiffs and for unforeseeable risks, or for injuries
that are indirect and derivative rather than direct and immediate.'
These principles cut strongly against the recognition of
the union's standing in AGCC to recover for the consequential injuries of loss of membership and dues that it allegedly had suffered as a result of the defendants' coercion of landowners and
contractors to deal with non-union firms. Neither principle
109. See AGCC, 459 U.S. at 548-49 & n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 279 (1934)); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 435 A (1965) (imposing liability on an intentional tortfeasor regardless of the foreseeability of a particular harm); FOWLER V.
HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 20.5, at 133 n.1 (2d ed. 1986)
("[Ilntended consequences... are always proximate."); W. PAGE KEETON ET
AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 43, at 293 (5th ed. 1984)
("One area in which it may be especially likely that the 'foreseeability' limitation will be cast aside is that of intentional torts, as to which it has been said
often enough that there is more extended liability").
110. AGCC, 459 U.S. at 547-48 & n.3; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 870 cmt. L (1979) ("For liability to exist [under an intentional tort],
the defendantfs conduct must have been the cause in fact of the harm to the
plaintiff.").
111. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 109, § 43, at 284-96; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 cmts. c, e & f(1965).
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suggests that the antitrust laws protect only consumers or
competitors in the markets affected by the defendants' conduct,
or that the direct and intended victims of antitrust misconduct
should be denied standing because they have not directly felt
the price or output effects of the violation alleged.
D. LEGISLATIVE INTENT AN) THE "ZONE OF INTERESTS" OF THE
STATUTORY ENACTMENT

Ultimately, the scope of the private treble-damages remedy
presents a question of congressional intent. The language of section 4 itself contains no hint that it was intended to permit suit
only by persons injured in their capacities as consumers or competitors in the markets affected by defendants' conduct. Even
assuming that the breadth of the statutory language in itself
could be thought to create an "ambiguity" or to lead to an
"absurd result" justifying resort to the legislative history of
4 and its statutory predecessor, section 7 of
Clayton Act section
the Sherman Act,112 that history also fails to provide any basis
for limiting standing in private antitrust actions to consumers
or competitors in the affected markets. In enacting the Sherman Act, members of Congress repeatedly expressed their concern with the impact of the early trusts on ultimate consumers
and competitors."' But identification of the ultimate objectives

112. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's
approach to statutory interpretation and concern over judicial encroachment).
113. See 20 CONG. REC. 1458 (1889) (statement of Sen. James Z. George)
(urging passage of a bill that would "put an end forever to the practice, now
becoming too common, of large corporations, and of single persons, too, of
large wealth, so arranging that they dictate to the people of this country what
they shall pay when they purchase, and what they shall receive when they

sell"), reprinted in I THE

LEGISLATiVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST

LAWS AND RELATED STATUTES 77 (Earl W. Kintner, ed.) (1978) [hereinafter
LEGISLATiVE HISTORY OF ANTITRUST LAWS]; 20 CONG. REC. 1457 (1889)
(statement of Sen. James K. Jones) ("[Trusts are] an example of evil that has
excited the greed and conscienceless rapacity of commercial sharks ...
preying upon every industry, and by their unholy combinations robbing their
victims, [and] the general public...."), reprintedin LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
ANTITRUST LAWS, supra, at 76; 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1890) (statement of Sen.
John Sherman) (noting that "[the trust's] governing motive is to increase the
profits of the parties composing it") reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
ANTITRUST LAWS, supra, at 117; 21 CONG. REC. 4100 (1890) (statement of Sen.
William E. Mason) ("[Trusts... have destroyed legitimate competition and
driven honest men from legitimate business enterprises. We propose now to
strike down these trusts .... "), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
ANTITRUST LAWS, supra, at 318; 21 CONG. REC. 4101 (1890) (statement of Sen.
John T. Heard) (noting that the Sherman Act would strike down trusts,
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that Congress sought to achieve does not necessarily or logically imply that the means Congress adopted to achieve these
ends were similarly circumscribed. Nothing in the legislative
history suggests that only consumers or competitors should
have antitrust standing to the exclusion of others directly injured as an instrument of achieving the defendants' anticompetitive objectives. To the contrary, the overriding tone of the
debates was that the private treble-damages remedy was
"remedial" in nature and should be construed liberally
14 to
achieve not simply compensatory but deterrent objectives.
The language and legislative history of the Clayton Act are
not the only potential bases for limiting the scope of section 4.
In addition to the background principle of "proximate cause,"
Congress also acted in light of the longstanding principle that
the remedy for a statutory violation should be confined to the
class of persons that Congress intended to protect. 15 This
principle has found frequent expression in negligence cases,
where it has been invoked, sometimes under the guise of
"proximate cause" analysis, to limit the scope of liability under
the "negligence per se" doctrine. As a leading authority states,
"[in many cases the evident policy of the legislature is to protect only a limited class of individuals. If so, the plaintiff must
bring himself within that class in order to maintain an action
based on the statute."116 The class of intended beneficiaries
"which control the markets... of this country [and] have advanced the cost of
such articles to every consumer, and that without rendering the slightest
equivalent therefor [sic] these illegal conspiracies against honest trade have
stolen untold millions from the people"), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
ANTITRUST LAWS, supra, at 320.
114. See, e.g., 21 CONG. REC. 2456 (1890) (statement of Sen. John Sherman) ('[B]eing a remedial statute, [the Sherman Act] would be construed liberally, with a view to promote its object. It defines a civil remedy, and the
courts will construe it liberally ... ."), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 113, at 115; see also LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
ANTITRUST LAWS, supra, at 127, 165, 167, 177, 178, 212 (various lawmakers
discussing the intent of making antitrust laws "vigorous" and expressing concerns that the proposed bill would be too weak). There was little discussion of
what is now section 4 of the Clayton Act during the 1914 House debates, other
than to note that "any person" harmed because of an antitrust violation would
be able to sue. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ANTITRUST LAWS, supra, at 1131,
1192.
115. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 109, § 36, at 224-25 (noting need for a
plaintiff to be included within the class of persons protected by a statute); cf
id. at 286-90 (discussing limitation of the Palsgraffrule to the unforeseeable
plaintiff and comparing that rule with the one limiting coverage through
statutory construction).
116. Id. at 224.
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has also proved influential in determining whether the courts
should imply a private right of action for a violation of a statute. 117 And, as pointed out below, the same generic inquiry underlies the development of the "zone of interests" formulation
of the standing inquiry in cases seeking judicial review of administrative action under the Administrative Procedure Act

(APA)." 8

In some sense, this principle is circular, because it seeks to
determine those persons that are protected by a statutory remedy by asking what persons the legislature intended to protect.
Nevertheless, the inquiry does serve reasonably well as a
principle of exclusion in cases where it is clear that the plaintiffs were not an object of legislative concern. If it is clear, for
example, that a statute providing for Sunday closings was intended to protect the social interests of the community at large,
rather than the safety of any particular class of individuals, an
injury resulting from illegal operation on Sunday will not invoke the doctrine of negligence per se. 1l9 Similarly, the Supreme Court declined to imply a private right of action in favor
of a corporate shareholder to enforce a federal statute prohibiting
corporate expenditures in presidential election campaigns on
the ground that the purpose of the statute was to protect fed-

117. In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), the Supreme Court held that four
factors were of primary relevance in determining whether a private right of
action to enforce a statutory prohibition should be judicially implied: (1)
whether the plaintiff is a member of the class for whose benefit the statute
was enacted; (2) whether there is any indicia of legislative intent to create or
deny a private remedy; (3) whether there is consistency with the underlying
purposes of the legislation; and (4) whether the cause of action is one that is
relegated to state law. See id. at 77-78. In subsequent decisions, the Court
has made clear that the ultimate issue is whether Congress intended to create
a private right of action, although the Cort factors remain relevant as guides
to congressional intent. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 179 (1988)
("In determining whether to infer a private cause of action from a federal
statute, our focal point is Congress intent in enacting the statute."); see also
Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 145 (1985); Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 770 (1981); Transamerica
Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979); Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979). This approach "reflects a concern,
grounded in separation of powers, that Congress rather than the courts controls the availability of remedies for violations of statutes." Wilder v. Virginia
Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 n.9 (1990).
118. See infra notes 125-150 and accompanying text (analyzing the APA
"zone of interests" standing formula and discussing its application to section 4
of the Clayton Act).
119. See KEETON ETAL., supra note 109, § 36, at 222-23.
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influence, rather than to protect
eral elections from corrupt
20
corporate shareholders.
Because the ultimate objective of the Sherman and Clayton Acts was to protect consumers from the price-enhancing
and output-reducing effects of anticompetitive behavior, some
courts have held that standing should be limited to the affected
consumers, or, at the very most, to consumers and excluded
competitors. This position, however, takes too narrow a view of
the Congressional intent underlying section 4, which was conceived as a broadly remedial measure with important deterrent
as well as compensatory objectives. Nothing in the history of
section 4 makes it clear that Congress intended to provide no
protection to persons directly and intentionally injured by an
antitrust defendant as a means of achieving its anticompetitive
objectives, such as the trade show organizers in the first illustrative example,' 21 or the cost consultants in the second. 1" As
a matter of logic and common sense, Congress would have
wanted to provide such direct targets and indispensable cogs in
an anticompetitive scheme with a private right of action to
achieve the deterrent objectives of section 4. As a leading
commentator points out, "[t]he class of persons to be protected
may of course be a very broad one, extending to all those likely
to be injured by the violation[;]" 123 and "[a] broad purpose of
maximum protection, found as the basis of the 124
statute, will of
course encourage such [a broad] interpretation."
The most explicit consideration of the relevance of this
"zone of interests" analysis to RICO and, inferentially, antitrust standing analysis is found in the opinion of Justice Scalia
in Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., previously

120. See Cort, 422 U.S. at 81-82; cf. California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287,
294 (1981) (declaring no implied private right of action based on a general
statutory prohibition of obstructions on navigable waters of the United States
where the statute did not "unmistakably focus on any particular class of
beneficiaries whose welfare Congress intended to further"); UniversitiesResearchAss'n, 450 U.S. at 772 (noting the Coures reluctance to allow a private
remedy when Congress "has framed the statute simply as a general prohibition or a command to a federal agency") (quoting Canon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 667, 690-92 (1979)); Touche & Ross, Co., 442 U.S. at 575
(holding that a congressionally created regulatory scheme did not create an
implied right of action).
121. See supra text accompanying note 10.
122. See supra text accompanying note 11.
123. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 109, § 36, at 224.
124. Id. at 227.
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discussed'2

Because the Court denied standing in Holmes on
"proximate cause" grounds, a majority of the Court found it
unnecessary to consider the question on which certiorari had
been granted. That question was whether RICO standing
should be limited to the purchasers and sellers of securities
where the underlying "predicate offense" was a violation of
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, under
which the Court had limited the judicially implied
private right
126
of action to purchasers and sellers of securities.
Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, did address
that question. Invoking a "zone of interests" standing test derived from cases interpreting the APA's conferral of standing to
challenge agency action on any person "adversely affected or
aggrieved," 2 ' he concluded that "judicial inference of a zone-ofinterests requirement, like judicial inference of a proximatecause requirement, is a background practice against which
Congress legislates."128
Applying that test to the RICO private right of action,
which as noted was modeled directly on section 4, Justice
Scalia declined to limit standing only to purchasers and sellers
of securities protected by the underlying section 10(b) implied
right of action. In his view, standing under RICO should normally be interpreted in consonance with the standing principles that apply to the underlying predicate offense. However,
the case before the Court presented a unique standing issue
because the purchaser and seller limitation in private actions
under section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5 had been adopted by
the Court as an exercise of legislative judgment to limit an
implied private right of action that the Court itself had created,

"a practice we have since happily abandoned

.... "129

By con-

trast, in the case of RICO (and, a fortiori, Clayton Act section 4
on which its remedial provision was based), Congress expressly
created the right of action at issue. Policy considerations such
as the difficulty of assessing the merits of nonpurchasers' and
sellers' claims and the threat of strike suits "are perhaps
among the factors properly taken into account in determining
the zone of interests covered by a statute, but they are surely
125. 503 U.S. 258 (1992). For a more detailed discussion of this case, see
supra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
126. See id. at 263-65.
127. See, eg., Blocky. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340,345 (1984).
128. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 287.
129. Id. at 289.
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not alone enough to restrict standing to purchasers or sellers
13 °
under a text that contains no hint of such a limitation."
Although the APA's broad "zone of interests" standing
formulation arose in a different statutory context, it raises important parallels with the standing inquiry under section 4 of
the Clayton Act, as Justice Scalia implicitly recognized. Like
the APA's broad authorization for judicial review by any
"person... adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action
within the meaning of a relevant statute,"1 31 section 4 of the
Clayton Act frames its authorization for private actions in the
broadest possible terms, permitting suit by "any person... injured in his business or property" by reason of anything prohibited by the antitrust laws.132 As it has under section 4, the Court, in interpreting the judicial review provisions
of the APA, has recognized that Congress could not have intended literally to authorize suit by "any person" whose injury
would not have occurred but for the conduct at issue, and has
sought to draw a line that is most consistent with congressional intent in enacting the relevant statute. 133 Like the APA,
which the Court has held must be interpreted "not grudgingly
but as serving a broad remedial purpose," 134 the history of the
private treble-damages remedy makes clear that it was conceived by Congress as a remedial measure that should be lib35
erally construed.1
The Supreme Court's decisions interpreting the standing
provisions of the APA have concluded that section 702 authorizes judicial review of agency action by any adversely affected
party who is within the "zone of interests" sought to be protected by the statute in question. 136 This formulation, however,
has not led the Court to confine standing only to those plain-

130. Id. (emphasis added).
131. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994).
132. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).
133. See Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987)
(discussing use of "zone of interest" test to assess congressional intent).
134. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 156
(1970).
135. See supra note 114 (citing congressional support for remedial nature
of statute).
136. See Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Newport
News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 115 S. Ct. 1278, 1283 (1995); Air Courier
Conference of Am. v. American Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517, 523
(1991); Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990); Clarke, 479
U.S. at 396-97; DataProcessing,397 U.S. at 153.
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tiffs who were the direct or intended beneficiaries of the statute. For example, in Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass'n,137 the
Court held that an association of securities dealers had standing to challenge the Comptroller of the Currency's decision to
allow two national banks to offer discount brokerage services
at their branch offices and other locations. The Court rejected
the Comptroller's argument that the dealers lacked standing
because Congress had passed the relevant statute to protect
state-chartered banks from competitive inequality rather than
to protect competing securities dealers. 38 The Court held that
the APA standing requirement that the plaintiffs injuries be
"arguably within the zone of interests" of the statute in question did not require that Congress have intended, by its enactment, to benefit the plaintiffs class. 39 Rather, standing was to
be denied only
if the plaintiffs interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent
with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be
assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit. The test is not
meant to be especially demanding; in particular, there need be no
indication14 of congressional purpose to benefit the would-be-

plaintiff. 0

The Court has consistently reached the same conclusion in
cases under the APA. Thus, in Investment Co. Institute v.
Camp,' the Court allowed an organization of competing investment companies to challenge the Comptroller of the Currency's decision to allow national banks to operate mutual investment funds as a violation of the Glass Steagall Act, even
though the central purpose of that Act was to protect the banks
and their customers from the financial risks and conflicts of interest created by the simultaneous conduct of the banking and
securities businesses. 42
Application of an analogous "zone of interests" standing
formulation under section 4 of the Clayton Act would uphold

137. 479 U.S. 388 (1987).
138. See id. at 392.
139. See id. at 398.
140. Id. at 399-400 (emphasis added).
141. 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
142. See id. at 629-34 ("In sum, Congress acted to keep commercial banks
out of the investment banking business largely because it believed that the
promotional incentives of investment banking and the investment banker's
pecuniary stake in the success of particular investment opportunities was destructive of prudent and disinterested commercial banking and of public confidence in the commercial banking system.").
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the standing of directly injured victims whose damages are the
means by which the defendants seek to achieve their anticompetitive ends, whether or not they suffered injuries as consumers or competitors in the markets at issue. So long as the core
Brunswick principle that plaintiffs not be allowed to recover for
damages caused by increased competition is honored, and
there is no danger of duplicative recovery, there is, in such
cases, no basis for concluding that the interests of the intermediaries "are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the
purposes implicit in [section 4] that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.""
As the Court itself recognized in Clarke, "zone of interests"
analysis has been invoked in a variety of contexts, such as the
judiciary's implication of private rights of action'" and, in the
constitutional sphere, as a "prudential" limitation on the right
of review.45 The Court cautioned, however, that standing
analysis developed in one statutory context is not necessarily
transferable to another.14 6 It explicitly declined to adopt the
requirement of Cort v. Ash that, for a private right of action to
be implied, the plaintiff must at a minimum be shown to be
"one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted." 147
If Cort's narrower version of "zone of interests" analysis
were a more apt analogy than cases decided under the broad
standing provisions of the APA, a strong argument could be
made that cases limiting standing under section 4 of the Clayton Act only to consumers and competitors in the markets affected by defendants' conduct were correctly decided. The language and history of the Sherman and Clayton Acts do
establish that consumers and competitors feeling the adverse
price and output effects of the anticompetitive conduct that
those statutes condemn were the "especial beneficiaries" of the
antitrust laws. As Justice Scalia recognized in Holmes, how-

143. Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987).
144. See Clarke, 479 U.S. at 396-97; see also Holmes v. Security Investor
Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 287-90 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring); Lujan v.
National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 883 (1990).
145. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753-56 (1984); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S.
464, 475 (1982); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100
n.6 (1979).
146. See Clarke, 479 U.S. at400 n.16.
147. Id. (quoting Cort, 422 U.S. at 78).
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ever, the implied private right of action analogy is not on
point.14 There, the question is whether the judiciary should
create a right of action where Congress has failed to do so, an
exercise in judicial lawmaking that could draw legitimacy only
from the clearest indication of congressional intent to permit a
particular class of persons to sue. That is because, in implying
a private right of action, "the central inquiry [is] whether Congress intended to create, either expressly or by implication, a
private cause of action."149 In making that determination, the
absence of any congressional intent to confer a special benefit
5°
on the class of which plaintiff is a member is usually fatal.1
The question under section 4 of the Clayton Act is entirely
different. As under the APA, Congress in section 4 explicitly
created a private right of action running broadly in favor of any
person injured by a violation of the antitrust laws. The question is whether that broad congressional authorization of suit
should be limited to less than its literal scope, and, if so, what
form that limitation should take. In that setting, as the Court
recognized in interpreting the APA in Clarke, a judicially imposed limitation of an express congressional authorization of
suit is justified only based on some clear indication that permitting review would be "marginally related to or inconsistent
with the purposes implicit in the statute."5 ' That assumption
cannot be made in suits by victims of the kind considered here,
who, in terms of the deterrent objectives of section 4, are "very
reasonable candidates" 152 to maintain a private action under
the antitrust laws.
E. IMPLIED REPEAL BY THE PROVISION OF ANOTHER REMEDY
Cases applying the multifactor AGCC balancing test to
deny standing to private antitrust plaintiffs have sometimes
cited the availability of another, nonantitrust remedy under
state or federal law as a basis for their decision.153 This ten-

148. See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 289 (Scalia, J., concurring).
149. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575 (1979).
150. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
151. Clarke,479 U.S. at 399.
152. Id. at 403.
153. See Vinci v. Waste Management, Inc., 80 F.3d 1372, 1376 (9th Cir.
1996) (finding damages from loss of job not to be within the scope of section 4),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1252 (1997). The Vinci court implied that breach of
contract or labor-related claims were the only appropriate remedies. See also
SAS v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 48 F.3d 39, 46 (st Cir. 1995) ("[Slupposing an anti-
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dency has been particularly strong in cases involving unions or
employees targeted for injury as a means of implementing an
anticompetitive scheme.'54 AGCC provides some support for
this approach. In denying the standing of the union to challenge the alleged coercion of landowners and general contractors to channel their business to non-union firms, the Supreme
Court noted that the interests of unions frequently are not
served by competition in labor markets and that federal law
includes
not only a broad labor exemption from the antitrust laws, but also a
separate body of labor law specifically designed to protect and encourage the organizational and representational activities of labor
unions. Set against this background, a union, in its capacity as bargaining representative, will frequently not be part of the class the
Sherman Act was designed to protect, especially in disputes with
employers with whom it bargains. 155

Somewhat contradictorily, however, the Court observed that it
had no occasion to decide whether defendants' activities were
1 56
protected by the statutory and nonstatutory labor exemptions.
Courts denying standing on this basis have not explained
why the availability of "another remedy" under a body of law
designed to protect different interests should cut against the
availability of the private treble-damages remedy to redress
injuries under the antitrust laws. In most cases, the "other
remedy" available to the plaintiff will be an action under state
trust violation occurred,... [the plaintiffs] remedies... lie in contract and the
other pertinent nonfederal claims asserted in its complaint."); Apperson v.
Fleet Carrier Corp., 879 F.2d 1344, 1.352 (6th Cir. 1989) (ruling that alleged
antitrust violation amounted to nothing more than a breach of a labor contract, "a claim that rarely, if ever, would implicate antitrust laws"), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947 (1990); Gregory Mktg. Corp. v. Wakefern Food Corp., 787
F.2d 92, 98 (3d Cir. 1986) (finding state contract law remedy adequate to redress the wrong of an employee fired for refusing to implement manufacturer's discriminatory pricing to a preferred distributor), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
821 (1986); Exhibitors' Serv., Inc. v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 788 F.2d
574, 580 n.7 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting tort remedies of interference with prospective business and interference with contract relations would adequately
have addressed the alleged antitrust wrong); McDonald v. Johnson & Johnson, 722 F.2d 1370, 1377 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that alleged conspiracy to
suppress pharmaceutical company's market was best resolved through a
breach of contract claim), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 870 (1984).
154. See, e.g., Sacramento Valley v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers,
888 F.2d 604, 608-09 (9th Cir. 1989); Apperson, 879 F.2d at 1352; Gregory
Mktg. Corp., 787 F.2d at 98; Province v. Cleveland Press Publ'g Co., 787 F.2d
1047, 1052-54 (6th Cir. 1986); Lucas v. Bechtel Corp., 800 F.2d 839, 846 (9th
Cir. 1986).
155. AGCC, 459 U.S. 519, 539-40 (1983).
156. Id. at 540 n.43.
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tort or contract law. For example, an employee discharged for
refusing to implement a defendant's anticompetitive pricing
policies might assert claims for breach of the employment
agreement, or for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. But it has long been held that the availability of state tort
and contract remedies for conduct that also violates the antitrust laws does not displace the private antitrust remedy provided by section 4,157 and the pursuit of pendent state tort and
158
contract claims in federal antitrust actions is commonplace.
In many cases, the invocation of "another remedy" in cases
denying standing under section 4 is a tautology. Most commonly, the plaintiff is denied standing on the ground that its
injuries are only indirect and derivative of those suffered by
the direct victims of the defendant's anticompetitive activities,
and recognition of plaintiffs standing would therefore be contrary to the background principle of proximate cause against
which section 4 must be read. In such cases, the observation
that other tort, contract, or labor law remedies may be available to the plaintiffs adds nothing to the analysis of standing
under the antitrust laws. The existence of other remedies may
suggest or illustrate the derivative nature of the plaintiffs
claims, but it does not demonstrate that fact. The objection to
relying on the existence of "other remedies" to deny antitrust
standing is that it improperly assumes implied preemption of
157. See, e.g., Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Prod., 433 F.2d 1073, 1075 (9th
Cir. 1970) ("Successful maintenance of an antitrust suit does not depend upon
the availability or nonavailability of a common-law remedy for that wrong."),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 923 (1971). However, where the terms of trade at issue
have already been fixed by contract, contract law, rather than antitrust law,
provides the appropriate remedy for a breach. See, e.g., Orion Pictures Distrib. Corp. v. Syufy Enter., 829 F.2d 946, 949 (9th Cir. 1987). But see Z Channel Ltd. Partnership v. Home Box Office, Inc., 931 F.2d 1338, 1344-45 (9th
Cir. 1991) (conspiracy to refuse to modify a contract for the future is actionable under the antitrust laws), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1033 (1992).
158. See Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 486 n.1 (1982)
(involving a pendent breach of contract claim); Purgess v. Sharrock, 33 F.3d
134, 139 (2d Cir. 1994) (involving pendent claims for breach of contract, defamation, and tortious interference with prospective economic advantage); U.S.
Anchor Mfg., Inc. v. Rule Indus., Inc., 7 F.3d 986 (11th Cir. 1993) (involving a
pendent claim for tortious interference with business relations), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 2710 (1984); Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 980 F.2d 171
(3d Cir. 1992) (involving a tortious interference with prospective business relationships), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 921 (1993); Paragould Cablevision, Inc. v.
City of Paragould, 930 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1991) (involving a pendent breach
of contract claim); Opdyke Inv. Co. v. City of Detroit, 883 F.2d 1265 (6th Cir.
1989) (involving pendent state-law tort and contract claims), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 963 (1991).
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the antitrust remedy where none in fact exists and diverts attention from the relevant points of analysis, which are whether
the plaintiffs injuries were proximately caused by the defendant's conduct, and whether they are sufficiently linked to the
procompetition policies of the antitrust laws.
In cases where the plaintiffs claims do not violate the core
Brunswick principle precluding recovery for injuries resulting
from increased competition, and the plaintiffs injuries are not
indirect or derivative, the denial of standing based on the
availability of "another remedy" must at bottom rest on the
conclusion that the availability of that remedy justifies the inference that Congress did not intend also to protect the plaintiff from competitive injury under section 4. The antitrust
remedy would thus be implicitly preempted, and the plaintiff
would not fall within the "zone of interests" protected by the
antitrust laws.
That conclusion is insupportable as a general proposition.
As noted, settled law holds that the antitrust laws supplement
general state tort and contract remedies, and are not displaced
by them.159 In effect, a denial of antitrust standing on the basis
of "another remedy" in such cases amounts to a species of implied exemption from or partial repeal of the antitrust laws. To
be sure, the repeal in such cases affects the remedy of a particular plaintiff, rather than those of all potential plaintiffs as
in the typical implied repeal or exemption case. In both instances, however, a court infers from the existence of another
applicable body of law an unstated congressional intent to deny
an antitrust remedy that otherwise would exist.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly said that, in view of
the "fundamental national economic policy" embodied in the
antitrust laws, repeals by implication are disfavored. 60 Implied repeal will be found only in the case of "plain repugnancy
between the antitrust and regulatory provisions" 161 and "only if
work,
necessary to make the [alternative statutory scheme]
162
and even then only to the minimum extent necessary."
These observations apply with particular force to the implied repeal of the private treble-damages remedy based on the

159.
160.
(1966).
161.
162.

See supra notes 157-158 and accompanying text.
See Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 218
United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 351 (1963).
Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
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availability of state tort or contract remedies to the plaintiff.
Because state rather than federal remedies are at issue, the
case for implied repeal is particularly tenuous. There is no necessity to reconcile two arguably inconsistent federal statutory
schemes,163 and states have no power to repeal a federal law.
Cases in which the Supreme Court has recognized implied repeals of the antitrust laws have involved alternative federal
regulatory schemes in which Congress has accorded an agency
broad jurisdiction over the conduct at issue, and the agency is
empowered to take competitive considerations into account,
justifying the conclusion that Congress intended the antitrust
laws to be displaced by a special competitive regime.1 6 Where
the agency lacks jurisdiction, or does not take account of competitive concerns, or where the conduct at issue is viewed as
the product of private business
judgment, the Court has not
165
found an implied repeal.
State common-law remedies, including remedies for
wrongful discharge of employees targeted as a means of implementing an anticompetitive scheme, satisfy none of the ordinary preconditions for implied repeal. No state entity has
exercised regulatory authority over the anticompetitive practices at issue, or authorized or approved them after considering
their competitive ramifications. The state courts in which such
common-law claims typically are heard lack jurisdiction to entertain federal antitrust claims, 166 and resolution of tort and
163. See, e.g., United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939)
("[Riepeals by implication are not favored. When there are two acts upon the
same subject, the rule is to give effect to both if possible.") (citations omitted).
164. See Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 691 (1975);
United States v. National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 735
(1975); Pan Am- World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 310
(1963); Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363, 388-89
(1973).
165. See National Gerimedical Hosp. & Gerontology Ctr. v. Blue Cross, 452
U.S. 378, 390 (1981) ("[Antitrust repeals are especially disfavored where the
antitrust implications of a business decision have not been considered by a
governmental entity.") (citations omitted); Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States, 410 U.S. 366, 374 (1973) ("When [commercial] relationships are governed in the first instance by business judgment and not regulatory coercion,
courts must be hesitant to conclude that Congress intended to override the
fundamental national policies embodied in the antitrust laws.") (citation omitted); Silver, 373 U.S. at 357 (finding no implied repeal where agency lacked
jurisdiction over practices at issue).
166. See Blumestock Bros. Advertising v. Curtis Publ'g, 252 U.S. 436, 441
(1920); Korek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist., 583 F.2d 378, 379 (7th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979); Cream Top Creamery v. Dean Milk
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contract issues does not turn on the competitive considerations
that inform the application of the federal antitrust laws. Finally,
the conduct at issue is the product of purely private decisionmaking, not regulatory coercion or influence.
The Supreme Court has analyzed cases involving claimed
immunity from the federal antitrust laws created by state
rather than federal law under the doctrine of Parker v.
Brown,'67 which held that Congress did not intend the federal
antitrust laws to apply to the anticompetitive activities of the
sovereign states. 16 8 As applied to private conduct, the Parker
doctrine justifies a claim of immunity only if the private anticompetitive conduct at issue is undertaken pursuant to a
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy,
and that conduct has been actively supervised by the state itself. 169 The availability of state tort and contract remedies for
anticompetitive conduct satisfies neither of these requirements.
Cases in which the "other remedies" rationale has had its
primary impact are those involving unions or employees in70
jured in the implementation of an anticompetitive scheme.'
Two of the illustrations of directly injured nonconsumer and
noncompetitor plaintiffs cited at the outset of this Article fall
into that category. In each, standing was denied. The denial of
standing in AGCC also arose in the union context. The Court
explicitly referred to the availability of a "separate body of labor law specifically designed to protect and encourage the organizational and representational activities17 1of labor unions" in
denying standing to the union in that case.
On the assumption that the existence of "other remedies"
under state tort and contract law generally provides no basis
for the denial of a section 4 remedy, do special considerations
uniquely applicable to the labor field justify the conclusion that
plaintiffs possessing state or federal remedies for their injuries
under the labor laws should be denied a remedy under section
4? In answering that question, one must first recognize that
the "other remedies" available in the typical labor case will not
Co., 383 F.2d 358, 363 (6th Cir. 1967).
167. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
168. See id. at 350.
169. See, e.g., California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n. v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 102-06 (1980).
170. See supra note 154.
171. AGCC, 459 U.S. 519, 539-40 (1983).
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be federal labor law remedies, but state tort or contract theories
such as breach of an employment agreement or wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. That was true in two of the
leading decisions considering whether an employee discharged
for refusing to implement an anticompetitive pricing scheme
should have standing under section 4. In both Ostrofe v. H.S.
Crocker Co.1" 2 and In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litigation
(Bichan),7 3 the employees in question were managers and the
courts gave no indication that they were covered by a collective
bargaining agreement. The employees' "other remedies," if
any, would therefore have been under state common law rather
than the federal labor laws. In that setting, it is difficult to see
why they should have been denied a section 4 remedy more
than any other antitrust plaintiff who possesses additional
remedies under state tort and contract law, so long as relief
was consistent with normal Brunswick and proximate cause
limitations.
The critical issue, then, is whether the potential availability of a federal labor law remedy to unions and union employees should result in the implied repeal of an otherwise extant
section 4 remedy, as the Supreme Court opaquely suggested in
AGCC.174 Even in this limited context, however, the case for
denying the section 4 remedy is tenuous.
In its most recent discussion of the statutory and nonstatutory labor exemptions, the Supreme Court broadly held
that economic conduct permissible for employers or employees
as part of the collective bargaining process under the federal
labor laws, such as the unilateral post-impasse implementation
of previously proposed terms by a multi-employer bargaining
unit, is impliedly exempt from the antitrust laws. 175 Even that
broad construction of the nonstatutory labor exemption will
have no application in the typical labor/antitrust case, however, because the termination or coercion of employees or their
unions in an attempt to implement or effectuate an anticompetitive scheme plays no part in legitimate collective bargaining.
This is illustrated by AGCC itself, where, despite the
Court's reference to the existence of "a broad labor exemption

172. 670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983), on remand, 740 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. dismissed, 469 U.S. 1200 (1985).
173. 681 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,460 U.S. 1016 (1983).
174. See AGCC, 459 U.S. at 539-40.
175. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2116, 2127 (1996).
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from the antitrust laws," the Court found it unnecessary to
decide whether the employers' alleged coercive conduct designed to force landowners and general contractors to employ
non-union firms fell within the labor exemption. 177 In fact,
given the Court's recent clarification of the nonstatutory labor
exemption as applicable to employer activities that "gr[olw out
of, and [are] directly related to, the lawful operation of the bargaining process," and its observation that "an agreement
among employers could be sufficiently distant in time and in
circumstances from the collective-bargaining process that a
rule permitting antitrust intervention would not significantly
interfere with that process," it is difficult to see how the nonstatutory labor exemption could have any relevance to cases of
the kind considered here.
But what of the unfair labor practice jurisdiction of the
NLRB? In some instances, anticompetitive conduct directed at
a union or its members in an effort to achieve an anticompetitive end in non-labor markets might violate some provision of
the Labor Act. In such cases, should the potential availability
of "another remedy" under the Labor Act preclude a remedy
under section 4, as the Court might be read to have implied in
AGCC? In its leading nonstatutory labor exemption decision,
Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100,19 the Supreme Court rejected that claim. Connell
involved a general contractor's contention that an agreement it
had signed with the union prohibiting it from subcontracting
with non-union firms violated the antitrust laws. The Court
first concluded that the nonstatutory labor exemption was inapplicable because the agreement in question constituted a direct restraint on a business market that was not justified by
the need to eliminate competition over wages and working
conditions. 180 The Court then rejected the contention that if
the clause violated the prohibition on "hot cargo" agreements
in section 8(e) of the Labor Act, the remedies provided by the
NLRA were exclusive. 8' In fact, rather than finding an implied repeal of the section 4 remedy by the availability of an
unfair labor practice remedy, one court of appeals has held that
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

AGCC, 459 U.S. at 539 (citations omitted).
See Id. at 539-40 n.43.
Brown, 116 S. Ct. at 2127.
421 U.S. 616 (1975).
See id. at 625.
See id. at 634.
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the existence of a Labor Act violation necessarily vitiates any
implied antitrust
exemption, thus bringing the antitrust laws
182
into play.
In sum, in cases involving acts directed at nonconsumer
and noncompetitor intermediaries as a means of implementing
an anticompetitive scheme, the availability of "other remedies"
under state tort or contract law, or under the federal labor
laws, provides an inadequate basis for the denial of a section 4
remedy that those plaintiffs otherwise would possess.
1I. DISTINGUISHING NONCONSUMERS AND
NONCOMPETITORS WITH STANDING FROM THOSE
WITHOUT
The previous discussion suggests that the denial of antitrust standing to intermediaries who are directly injured as a
means of achieving the defendants' anticompetitive objectives
finds no basis in the language, history, or purposes of the Clayton and Sherman Acts. Decisions holding or suggesting that
such direct victims lack standing, or that only consumers or
competitors in the affected markets may sue, are not based on
any effort to ascertain Congress's intent in enacting section 4.
Rather, they have focused on the freewheeling balancing approach of AGCC, which requires courts to weigh and balance
seven "factors" in determining whether an antitrust plaintiff
should be permitted to sue. The factors identified by the Court
in AGCC were:
1. whether the plaintiff has suffered the kind of injury
that Congress sought to redress-i.e., whether the
plaintiff has suffered "antitrust injury";183
2. the directness or indirectness of the plaintiff's injury; 184

182. See Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 602 F.2d
494 (3d Cir. 1979), vacated on other grounds,448 U.S. 902 (1980). Other cases
hold that a violation of the Labor Act should not be conclusive on the availability of the nonstatutory labor exemption, but none hold that the existence of a
Labor Act remedy in itself precludes a private action under section 4, and it is
clear that a Labor Act violation cuts against, rather than for, a claim of exemption. See Richards v. Neilsen Freight Lines, 810 F.2d 898, 906 (9th Cir.
1987) (finding that a violation of section 158(e) of the Labor Act does not preclude the availability of the nonstatutory labor exemption); Commerce Tankers Corp. v. National Maritime Union, 553 F.2d 793, 802 (2d Cir. 1977) ("We
do not believe that our prior holding that the clause violated § 8(e) necessarily
determines that antitrust [exemption] issue, although it lends support to appellants' position."), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 923 (1977).
183. AGCC, 459 U.S. at 538.
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3. the existence of other plaintiffs more directly injured
whose self-interest would motivate them to enforce the
antitrust laws;"8 5
4. whether the claim rests on a speculative measure of
186
damages;
5. the interest in avoiding duplicative recoveries;' 87
6. avoiding complex apportionment of damages; 188 and
7. defendants' intent to harm the plaintiff.'89
Unfortunately, the Court in AGCC and its other antitrust
standing decisions has given only minimal guidance regarding
the genesis of these factors, or their interrelationship and
relative importance. The court did not "assign specific weight
to its factors, individually, collectively or relatively."19 ° Although the Court's foray into the antitrust standing field may
have been intended to replace the divergent approaches to antitrust standing previously followed by the courts of appeals
with a more uniform national approach,19 ' it also introduced an
element of unprincipled discretion into standing analysis. The
unguided "balancing" of AGCC factors has had the effect of
permitting disguised decisions on the merits by courts hostile
to certain types of antitrust claims or plaintiffs. For example,
some courts have denied standing to competitors excluded from
the market on the ground that no injury to market competition,
as opposed to the plaintiff, has been shown, 92 even though ex184. See id. at 540.
185. See id. at 542.
186. See id. at 542-43.
187. See id. at 543-44.
188. See id.
189. See id. at 537.
190. In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144, 1166
(3d Cir. 1993); see also Sullivan v. Tagliabue, 25 F.3d 43, 46 (1st Cir. 1994)
(noting that AGCC "gives little guidance as to how to weigh the various factors, and whether the absence of a particular factor would be fatal to standing
in every instance").
191. SeeAGCC, 459 U.S. at 536 n.33.
192. See Balaklaw v. Lovell, 14 F.3d 793, 801-02 (2d Cir. 1994); R.C. Dick
Geothermal Corp. v. Thermogenics, Inc., 890 F.2d 139, 152 (9th Cir. 1989);
Bio-Medical Applications Management Co. v. Dallas Nephrology Assocs.,
1995-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1170,914 (E.D. Tex. 1995); Purgess v. Sharrock,
1993-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,349 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Scara v. Bradley Mem'l
Hosp., 1993-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,353 (E.D. Tenn. 1993). But see Levine v.
Central Fla. Med. Affiliates, Inc., 72 F.3d 1538, 1545 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding
that where no injury to market competition is present, the case should be decided on its merits without delving into an analysis of antitrust standing),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 75 (1996).
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cluded plaintiffs at least presumptively should be proper antitrust plaintiffs and the question of "injury to competition" in 193
a
rule of reason case goes to the merits rather than standing.
Other courts have used AGCC's "directness" and
"speculativeness" factors to deny standing on grounds that appear to be disguised decisions on the merits about causation in
fact. 194 One court went so far as to deny standing in an output
suppression case on the ground that no competitive injury had
been shown, even though a majority of the court concluded that
the plaintiff had alleged a per se violation of the antitrust laws
under which the plaintiff
was not required to establish specific
195
competitive injury.
In appraising the standing of nonconsumers and noncompetitors under the antitrust laws, a more focused discussion of
the origins, relationship and importance of the AGCC standing
"factors" is essential.
A. SOME STANDING FACTORS ARE MoRE IMPORTANT THAN
OTHERS

There is a difference in kind among the various AGCC
standing factors, and some are more important than others. It
is first essential to distinguish those factors identified by the
Court that appear to have been based on the background tortbased principle of proximate cause from those that rest on the
Court's perception of congressional intent specific to the antitrust laws themselves.
The factor most clearly falling in the latter category is
whether the plaintiffs injuries are "of a type that Congress
sought to redress in providing a private remedy for violations

193. See Harold Stores, Inc. v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 82 F.3d 1533,
1547-48 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 297 (1996); Metro Indus. Inc.
v. Sammi Corp., 82 F.3d 839, 848 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 181
(1996); Sicor Ltd. v. Cetus Corp., 51 F.3d 848, 854 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 170 (1995).
194. See Hodges v. WSM, Inc., 26 F.3d 36, 39 (6th Cir. 1994); Greater
Rockford Energy & Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 998 F.2d 391, 402 (7th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1111 (1994); Sharp v. United Airlines, Inc., 967
F.2d 404, 409 (10th Cir. 1992); Datagate, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 941
F.2d 864, 868-69 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 974 (1992); Austin v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 903 F.2d 1385, 1389 (11th Cir. 1990); Bell v. Dow
Chem. Co., 847 F.2d 1179, 1183 (5th Cir. 1988).
195. See R.C. Dick Geothermal Corp. v. Thermogenics, Inc., 890 F.2d 139,
150-53 (9th Cir. 1989). But see id. at 153 (Norris, J., dissenting) (finding that
standing had not been raised as an issue on appeal).
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of the antitrust laws."196 This "antitrust injury" component,
based on the Court's seminal decision in Brunswick, is obviously critical to standing analysis. It is self evident that no one
should be permitted to recover for damages that Congress did
not intend to prevent. AGCC, by its listing of multiple factors
to be weighed in the balance in resolving the standing inquiry,
might be taken to have suggested that the existence of
"antitrust injury" is only one factor among others, not determinative in itself. In fact, at least one court of appeals has suggested that this is an open question. 9 7 The Supreme Court,
however, appears to have resolved the issue in Cargill,Inc. v.
Monfort of Colorado,Inc., 98 where, discussing the standing of a
competitor to challenge a merger of competing firms, the Court
stated that the existence of antitrust injury is a "necessary, but
not always sufficient" precondition to the recognition of a private plaintiffs standing to sue. 199
The rule of Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 0 precluding recovery of overcharges under a "passing on" theory by plaintiffs
who purchase price-fixed goods indirectly through an intermediary rather than directly from the defendants, should also be
treated as an absolute rule of exclusion based on policies specific to the antitrust laws, rather than as one factor to be
weighed in the balance. It is true that the Court in Illinois
Brick (and its previous Hanover Shoe 0 1 decision dealing with
the corresponding right of a direct purchaser to recover the entire overcharge) relied on common-law principles of proximate
cause.2 2 However, the Illinois Brick result turns on the
196. AGCC, 459 U.S. at 538 (quoting Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 487-489).
197. See Sullivan v. Tagliabue, 25 F.3d 43, 47 n.9 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding
that absence of antitrust injury weighs heavily against standing; reserving
question whether its absence is determinative); cf. Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438, 1449 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that a plaintiff must
have suffered antitrust injury to have standing); South Dakota v. Kansas City
S. Indus., 880 F.2d 40, 46 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding that a causal connection between the antitrust violation and the plaintiffs injury is not sufficient to establish standing; plaintiff must have suffered direct antitrust injury in order
to have standing), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1023 (1990).
198. 479 U.S. 104 (1986).
199. Id. at 110 n.5.
200. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 735 (1977).
201. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
202. See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 741 (discussing the remoteness of the
indirect purchasers from the defendant); AGCC, 459 U.S. at 535-36 & n.33
(noting the struggle of common-law judges in defining "proximate cause" articulately).
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Court's determination that Congress, in the antitrust laws, did
not intend to allow for duplicative recovery by both direct and
indirect purchasers of price-fixed goods for the same overcharge.0 3 Where duplicative recovery necessarily would occur
if a plaintiff were permitted to sue, standing should be denied,
not in some cases, but in all.
The necessity for "complex apportionment of damages"
mentioned in AGCC is rarely relevant in the cases involving
the standing of directly injured intermediaries. It should not,
in any event, be viewed as an independent factor entitled to
separate weight. The necessity for "complex apportionment"
arises only as a means of preventing double recovery of the
same damages, in violation of Congress's intent.204 Thus, to
"weigh" the prohibition of duplicative recoveries and the necessity for complex apportionment of damages separately
would amount to double counting. If no duplicative recovery of
the same damages is likely to occur, complex apportionment of
damages is not needed to prevent it, and the "complex apportionment" factor is irrelevant.
The same cannot be said of AGCC's "direct injury" factor,
which does have independent significance and weight. The direct injury factor is, however, different in kind from the
"antitrust injury" and "duplicative recovery" factors previously
discussed. Because the requirement for antitrust injury and
the prohibition of duplicative recovery of the same damages
rest directly on the Court's perception of congressional intent
unique to the antitrust laws, an antitrust plaintiffs failure to
satisfy either requirement should serve as an absolute rule of
exclusion regardless of the presence or absence of any of the
203. See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 729; see also Blue Cross & Blue Shield
United v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1414 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 1288 (1996); Gulfstream III Assoc., Inc. v. Gulfstream Aerospace
Corp., 995 F.2d 425, 439 (3d Cir. 1993); In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938
F.2d 919, 925-26 (9th Cir. 1991), affd in part and rev'd in part on other
grounds, 509 U.S. 764 (1993); Austin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 903 F.2d
1385, 1392 (11th Cir. 1990); County of Oakland v. City of Detroit, 866 F.2d
839, 848 (6th Cir. 1989); cf. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100-03
(1989) (holding that state antitrust laws allowing recovery by indirect purchasers are not preempted by the federal antitrust prohibition, enunciated in
IllinoisBrick, against indirect purchaser recovery).
204. For example, in AGCC, the Court discussed this factor in the same
breath with that of precluding duplicative recoveries, noting that its previous
decisions "have stressed the importance of avoiding either the risk of duplicative recoveries on the one hand, or the danger of complex apportionment of
damages on the other." 459 U.S. at 543-44.
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other AGCC factors. By contrast, the "direct injury" factor
finds its origins, not in any policy specific to the antitrust laws,
but in the background tort principle of proximate cause against
which Congress legislated when it enacted the private trebledamages remedy. As the Court noted in AGCC, when Congress
enacted the Sherman Act in 1890, "a number of judge-made
rules circumscribed the availability of damages recoveries in
both tort and contract litigation-doctrines such as foreseeability
and proximate cause, directness of injury, certainty of damages, and privity of contact."2 5 Congress "simply assumed that
antitrust damages litigation would be subject to constraints
comparable to well-accepted common-law rules applied in comparable litigation."0 6
Because of its common-law origins, the direct injury/proximate cause component of AGCC standing analysis
necessarily assumes the flexible character of those judge-made
rules, which are designed to accommodate myriad circumstances as they present themselves for judicial consideration.
The "direct injury" component of standing analysis, therefore,
is properly one factor to be "weighed" with others in determining whether standing to challenge a defendant's antitrust violation should extend to the plaintiff.
By contrast, AGCC's "speculative damages" factor should
not receive independent weight. Rather, it is a restatement
and elaboration of the directness factor. If damages are indirect, they are more likely to be speculative.0 7 If a plaintiff has
been injured directly by a defendant's antitrust misconduct,
speculativeness of damages should not be viewed as an independent basis for denying "standing" under the antitrust
laws. 208 Under well-settled rules governing the required certainty of proof of the fact20 9 and amount2 0 of damages in anti-

205. Id. at 532-33 (footnotes omitted).
206. Id. at 533.
207. See, e.g., Sullivan, 25 F.3d at 51-52 ("Because the harm to SMO was
indirect, and was caused, in part, by independent intervening factors... we
agree... that SMO's damages claims are 'highly speculative,' and are an additional factor weighing against a grant of standing in this case.") (citation
omitted).
208. See, e.g., Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 791 F.2d
1356, 1366 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that damages of football stadium directly
harmed by failure to secure tenancy of football team restrained from relocating by NFL territorial allocation rule were not unduly speculative), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 826 (1986).
209. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 114
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trust actions, the speculativeness of plaintiffs damages goes to
the viability of the plaintiffs claim on the merits. If a directly
injured plaintiffs damages cannot accurately be ascertained,
that plaintiffs claims will fail on the merits, not for lack of
"standing."
The two most enigmatic of the AGCC standing "factors"
remain-the defendant's specific "intent" to harm the plaintiff,
and "[tihe existence of an identifiable class of [other] persons
whose self-interest would normally motivate them to vindicate
the public interest in antitrust enforcement." 211 As to intent,
the Supreme Court in AGCC stated that it was "not a panacea
that will enable any complaint to withstand a motion to dismiss."2 12 However, the Court did not say what significance that
factor has or the weight that it should receive. The lower federal courts generally have given little weight to the factor of intent where the presence of absence of standing was clear on
other grounds.213 For example, where the Brunswick and Illinois Brick rules requiring "antitrust injury" and prohibiting
multiple recovery of the same overcharges are violated, even
clear proof of a malicious intent to injure the plaintiff should
not confer standing. Conversely, where a presumptively proper
antitrust plaintiff such as a directly injured consumer or excluded competitor seeks redress, courts have felt no need to
rely on the "intent" factor to uphold standing.214
& n.9 (1969); see also Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543, 572-73 (1990);
Greater Rockford Energy & Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 998 F.2d 391, 401
(7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1111 (1994); National Farmers' Org.,
Inc. v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 850 F.2d 1286, 1293 (8th Cir. 1988),
amended, 878 F.2d 1118 (8th Cir. 1989); Argus Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
801 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1088, 1292 (1987); World
of Sleep, Inc. v. La-Z-Boy Chair Co., 756 F.2d 1467, 1477-79 (10th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 823 (1986); King & King Enters. v. Champlin Petroleum
Co., 657 F.2d 1147, 1156 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1164 (1982).
210. See J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 56568 (1981) (noting that the standard for proof of amount of damages is not unduly rigorous); Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282
U.S. 555, 562-67 (1931); In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litigation,
998 F.2d 1144, 1175 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1021 (1994); Amerinet, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 972 F.2d 1483, 1493-98 (8th Cir. 1992); MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1161 (7th Cir. 1983); Tire
Sales Corp. v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 637 F.2d 467, 474-75 (7th Cir. 1980).
211. AGCC, 459 U.S. at 537 & n.35, 542.
212. Id. at 537.
213. See, e.g., R.C. Dick Geothermal Corp. v. Thermogenics, Inc., 890 F.2d
139, 146-47 (9th Cir. 1989) (denying standing to plaintiff although plaintiffs
allegation of intent was accepted as true).
214. See In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919, 925-26 (9th Cir.
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The factor of intent to injure the plaintiff therefore appears
to have its primary relevance in cases where it is not clear
whether the plaintiffs injuries should be viewed as direct or
indirect, 1 5 and in the cases that are the specific focus of this
Article, where defendants' anticompetitive scheme is directly
aimed at intermediaries who are not (or at least debatably are
not) consumers or competitors in the affected markets. 6 The
1991) (holding that plaintiffs standing was proper on several grounds), affd
in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 509 U.S. 764 (1993); Pennsylvania
Dental Ass'n v. Medical Serv. Ass'n, 815 F.2d 270, 278 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding
that plaintiff had standing as the "immediate target" of antitrust conduct),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 851 (1987); Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520,
532-38 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding that plaintiff excluded from competition to acquire a natural monopoly had standing; not necessary to demonstrate injury
to the welfare of the ultimate consumer in order to have standing; injury to
the competitive process is enough); La Salvia v. United Dairymen, 804 F.2d
1113, 1115-16 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that competitor had standing to challenge alleged monopolization), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 928 (1987); Potters Med.
Ctr. v. City Hosp. Ass'n, 800 F.2d 568, 575-77 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that alleged target of monopolistic practices had standing); Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Conm'n v. NFL, 791 F.2d 1356, 1363-65 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that
both football team restrained from relocating and stadium competing for
team's tenancy had standing to challenge NFL's territorial restrictions).
215. See Sanner v. Board of Trade, 62 F.3d 918, 926-30 (7th Cir. 1995)
(holding that sellers of soy beans in cash market had antitrust standing to
challenge conspiracy to require liquidation of futures contracts in view of close
interrelationship of the markets and intent to depress cash market); In reAntitrust Litig., 938 F.2d at 925-26 (finding that defendants' denial of reinsurance
with intent to restrict the kinds of insurance available to consumers of primary insurance supported the consumers' standing); Mr. Furniture Warehouse, Inc. v. Barclays AmJCommercial, Inc., 919 F.2d 1517, 1521 (11th Cir.
1990) (denying standing to furniture shop owner to challenge a credit agency's
allegedly discriminatory credit lending practices, and noting that the defendant's "anticompetitive intent was directed at the competing ... [credit agencies], and not at Mr. Furniture"); Adams v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 828
F.2d 24, 26 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("[Wie read Associated General as saying only
that a showing of... intent may be required to establish an antitrust violation (and thus necessary to avoid a motion to dismiss.. .), and may help focus
the standing analysis.") (citations omitted).
216. See Yellow Pages Cost Consultants, Inc. v. GTE Directories Corp., 951
F.2d 1158, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 1991) (recognizing the standing of independent
yellow-pages consulting and purchasing agents to challenge refusal of yellowpages seller to deal with them, relying in part on fact that '[t]he addition of
specific intent to this direct injury also makes antitrust standing appropriate") (citation omitted), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 913 (1992); Ostrofe v. H.S.
Crocker Co., 740 F.2d 739, 742 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding that sales manager of
company who was allegedly forced to resign after refusing to rig prices of
lithograph labels had standing to sue under section 4 because "Nhiis alleged
injury was caused by the boycott, it was intentionally inflicted, and it was direct") (emphasis added), cert. dismissed, 469 U.S. 1200 (1985); Crimpers Promotions Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 724 F.2d 290, 294 (2d Cir. 1983)
(upholding standing of trade show organizers to challenge cable operators' al-
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question remains, however, what weight the factor should receive, and why it is relevant at all.
The answer lies in the source of this aspect of the AGCC
standing analysis, which originated not in any consideration of
congressional intent unique to the antitrust laws, but, like the
factor of directness or remoteness of injury, in the judicially
created background principles of tort causation against which
Congress legislated when it enacted section 4. Like the factor
of directness, the factor of intent is not a rule of absolute exclusion but constitutes part of a flexible balancing approach
designed to mark out the appropriate boundaries of the trebledamages remedy on a case-by-case basis. In tort causation
analysis, the presence of a specific intent to injure the plaintiff
cuts in favor of recognizing standing even where the plaintiff's
injuries might be viewed as indirect.2" 7 Similarly, in antitrust
standing analysis, an intent to injure the plaintiff should tip
the balance where the plaintiffs standing is otherwise in
doubt.
The relevance of "other plaintiffs" who are likely to sue
remains shrouded in uncertainty. This factor has been invoked
to deny standing in nonconsumer, noncompetitor plaintiff cases
on the ground that the injured consumers or competitors themselves may sue to vindicate the public interest in antitrust enforcement. 218 There is, however, some irony in this aspect of
leged organization of a boycott of the trade show, relying, in part, on fact that
'[i]njury to [the plaintiffl Crimpers was the precisely intended consequence of
defendants' boycott.. .), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984).
217. See supra notes 109-110 and accompanying text (explaining that although proximate cause is usually a limiting principle when determining tort
liability, it is assumed for intentional tort cases and the plaintiff need only
prove that the conduct was the cause-in-fact of the injury).
218. See SAS of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 48 F.3d 39, 44
(1st Cir. 1995) (denying standing to telephone servicing company to challenge
telephone company's alleged breach of contract because "ifthe breach played a
part in an antitrust violation, the conduct itself was an antitrust violation because of the anticompetitive threat posed to other potential plaintiffs, not [the
plaintiff] SAS"); Lucas v. Bechtel Corp., 800 F.2d 839, 844-45 (9th Cir. 1986)
(holding that nuclear power planefs competitors were better plaintiffs than
labor union to address alleged suppression of wages in the nuclear power
plant design and construction market); Gregory Mktg. Corp. v. Wakefern Food
Corp., 787 F.2d 92, 97 (3d Cir. 1986) (finding apple juice distributing company's competitors to be better plaintiffs than the apple juice manufacturer's
broker to challenge a preferred discount to a distributor, which the broker refused to implement), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 821 (1986); In re Industrial Gas
Antitrust Litig. (Bichan), 681 F.2d 514, 520 (7th Cir. 1982) (finding that the
"R[language in section 4] implies a standing requirement limiting the statute's
applicability to those plaintiffs who are efficient enforcers of the antitrust
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the AGCC standing analysis. In most cases, the parties denied
standing to sue on this ground are those who have actually
commenced an action to enforce the antitrust laws, whereas
the other hypothetically "likely" private attorneys general
have, in reality, elected not to sue. Furthermore, there are
substantial reasons to question whether, in the ordinary case,
consumers who individually may have suffered small damages,
and who may be unable to surmount the IllinoisBrick indirect
219
purchaser rule, will be aware of their injuries or likely to sue.
Directly injured distributors may also be unlikely to sue, either
because they have passed on most of the overcharges to ultimate consumers or because they fear jeopardizing their business relationship with the defendant. Similarly, where the defendants' anticompetitive scheme is not aimed at the exclusion
of competitors, but rather seeks to enhance prices to the consumer or to facilitate price discrimination to a disfavored purchaser, competitors may well be the beneficiaries of the higher
or discriminatory prices,220and thus will not have suffered antitrust injury themselves.
In short, there is an air of unreality in rejecting the
standing of an antitrust plaintiff who is the direct target and
essential instrument of the defendant's anticompetitive scheme
and has actually elected to sue in favor of the hypothetical preferred consumer or competitor plaintiff who has not chosen to
vindicate the public interest in antitrust enforcement. Of
course, denial of standing to the intermediary may be appropriate where there is a significant risk of multiple recovery of
the same damages by both the intermediary and a consumer or
competitor in the relevant market, in violation of the rule of Illinois Brick. However, as discussed below, in most intermediary cases of the kind discussed here, there is no danger of duplicative or multiple recovery of the same damages.
AGCC's "other plaintiff" factor has, in the course of application by the lower federal courts, particularly in the intermediary cases, been detached from its moorings. The Supreme
Court's initial reference to the "other plaintiffs" factor in AGCC
laws") (citation omitted), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1016 (1983).
219. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Tagliabue, 25 F.3d 43, 51 & n.12 (1st Cir. 1994)
(noting that those most directly affected by antitrust violations are not always
the most likely to detect a violation and/or bring suit).
220. See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 337
(1990) ("A] competitor may not complain of conspiracies that... set minimum
prices at any level.") (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio
Co., 475 U.S. 574, 585 n.8 (1986)).
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was not as an independent, stand-alone basis for the denial of
standing, but rather as an elaboration on its discussion of the
overriding proximate cause consideration of the indirectness of
the plaintiffs' injuries in that case. Noting that the coerced
landowners and contracting parties were the direct victims of
defendants' activities, and that the plaintiff union's injuries
were only indirect and derivative," the Court observed that
[ilf either these firms, or the immediate victims of coercion by defendants, have been injured by an antitrust violation, their injuries
would be direct and... they would have a right to maintain their
own treble damages actions against the defendants.... The existence of an identifiable class of persons whose self-interest would
normally motivate them to vindicate the public interest in antitrust
enforcement diminishes the justification for allowing a more remote
party such as the Union to perform the office of a private attorney
general. Denying the Union a remedy on the basis of its allegations
in this case is not likely to leave a significant antitrust violation undetected or unremedied.mn

Thus, in its original context, it is clear that the "other
plaintiffs" aspect of AGCC was focused on the existence of
other more directly injured plaintiffs who would be likely to
3
It
vindicate the public interest in antitrust enforcement. 22
221. AGCC, 459 U.S. at 540-42.
222. IL at 541-42 (emphasis added).
223. For treatment of the "other plaintiffs" factor in settings involving indirect and derivative injuries, see, for example, GKA Beverage Corp. v.
Honickman, 55 F.3d 762, 766-67 (2d Cir. 1995) (denying standing to soft drink
distributors claiming that soft drink manufacturer forced bottler out of business), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 381 (1995); Tagliabue,25 F.3d at 51-52 (denying
standing to football stadium lessor to challenge NFL's allegedly monopolistic
rules that disallowed sale of football team); International Raw Materials, Ltd.
v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 978 F.2d 1318, 1329 (3d Cir. 1992) (denying standing to
soda-ash terminal operator to challenge practices of soda ash producers because plaintiffs "is neither a producer nor a consumer of soda ash"), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 988 (1993); Mr. Furniture Warehouse, Inc. v. Barclays
AmJCominmercial Inc., 919 F.2d 1517, 1520 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that
commercial creditors were more direct plaintiffs than furniture store owner to
challenge alleged antitrust violation in providing credit to furniture purchasers), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 815 (1991); R.C. Dick Geothermal Corp. v. Thermogenics, Inc., 890 F.2d 139, 148 (9th Cir. 1989) (denying standing to lessor of
land to challenge lessee's activities that allegedly prevented plaintiff lessor
from profiting from steam market); South Dakota v. Kansas City S. Indus.,
880 F.2d 40, 46 n.15 (8th Cir. 1988) (denying standing to state to challenge
railroad company's allegedly monopolistic activities because consumers of coal
and competitors in coal industry had already brought suit against the railroads), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1023 (1990); Adams v. Pan Am. World Airways,
Inc., 828 F.2d 24, 29 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding that former employees of bankrupt airline lacked standing to challenge anticompetitive practices of competitors of defunct airline partly because superior plaintiffs existed--consumers of
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should not be read for the further, and more problematic,
proposition that even directly injured victims of an antitrust
violation should be denied standing because other potential
consumer or competitor plaintiffs also exist whose injuries are
arguably "more serious" from the standpoint of antitrust policy.224 That result would parse and negate the expansive "any
person" language of section 4 without any foundation in the
background tort principle of proximate cause, or in the rules of
absolute exclusion of Brunswick and IllinoisBrick. 5
In Yellow Pages Cost Consultants, the court of appeals, in
upholding the standing of the consultants to challenge the defendants' boycott of their services, rejected the argument that,
because defendants' ultimate objective was to obtain higher
prices from advertisers, the existence of the advertisers as potential "other plaintiffs" should result in the denial of standing
to the consultants:
Such analysis mistakes why we consider the factor of more appropriate antitrust plaintiffs. The factor is not, as the [trial court's] analysis would suggest, an exercise in identifying the select, in the style of
a 17th Century Puritan village and its theological musings. It is instead an attempt to ensure antitrust violations will, in fact, be identified and remedied in our own Twentieth Century world of imperfect
competition as understood by modem economics.... We refuse to
rely on the speculation that some individual advertiser would have
lost sufficient money from GTE's refusal to deal with
6 Consultants to
provide it with an adequate incentive to bring suit.

In sum, like the factor of speculativeness of damages, the
"other plaintiffs" factor of AGCC should be read, as it was
transatlantic air transportation and the defunct airline itself), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 934 (1985); Alberta Gas Chems., Ltd. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 826 F.2d 1235, 1240 (3d Cir. 1987) ("Once antitrust injury has been demonstrated by a causal relationship between the harm and the challenged aspect of the alleged violation, standing analysis is employed to search for the
most effective plaintifffrom among those who have suffered loss.") (emphasis
added) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988); cf. Consolidated
Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S-AL, 871 F.2d 252, 260 (2d Cir. 1989)
(recognizing standing of target of hostile takeover under section 16 of the
Clayton Act because "[the target of a proposed takeover has the most immediate interest in preserving its independence as a competitor in the market"),
amended, 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989).
224. Some intermediary cases addressing the "other plaintiffs" factor seem
to adopt this problematic approach. See supra note 218 and accompanying
text.
225. See, e.g., In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d
1144, 1168-69 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding that the existence of other direct victims
did not diminish directness of plaintiffs' injuries), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1091
(1994).
226. Yellow Pages Cost Consultants, Inc. v. GTE Directories Corp., 951
F.2d 1158, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 913 (1992).
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originally conceived, as referring to the existence of other more
directly injured plaintiffs who would be likely to vindicate the
public interest in antitrust enforcement. It thus represents an
elaboration on the basic background principle of proximate
cause and should not be invoked to screen out directly injured
antitrust plaintiffs in favor of other plaintiffs who hypothetically might sue, but have not done so. So long as the plaintiffs
before the court satisfy the requirements of Illinois Brick and
Brunswick, and have been directly injured by the defendant's
conduct, the presence of other consumer-competitor plaintiffs
who hypothetically might sue should be irrelevant to section 4
standing analysis.
B. DISTINGUISHING INTERMEDIARIES WHOSE INJURIES ARE
DIRECT AND INSTRUMENTAL FROM THOSE WHOSE INJURIES
ARE DERIVATIVE OR INCIDENTAL

The previous analysis suggests that there is no principled
basis of statutory interpretation for excluding intermediaries
directly injured by defendants as a means of effectuating an
anticompetitive scheme from the section 4 remedy simply because they are not consumers or competitors in the markets restrained by the defendants' conduct, or because they may also
possess a remedy under another law. By contrast, where the
injuries of nonconsumers and noncompetitors are only derivative of or incidental to those directly inflicted on consumers
and competitors in the affected markets, the background tort
principle of proximate cause against which section 4 must be
read would deny their standing.
Most of the decisions denying section 4 standing to nonconsumer and noncompetitor plaintiffs can be explained on the
ground that their injuries were only derivative of those inflicted on consumers and competitors in the affected markets.
Thus, in contrast to the ongoing debate about whether takeover
targets in merger cases should have standing,17 the courts
227. See Brodley, supra note 88, at 78-106. Compare Consolidated Gold
Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A_, 871 F.2d 252, 258 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that a
target firm of a hostile tender offer and its partially owned subsidiary had
standing to seek injunctive relief because loss of independence to compete is a
type of injury the antitrust laws were meant to prevent), modified, 890 F.2d
569 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. dismissed, 492 U.S. 939 (1989), with Anago, Inc. v.
Tecnol Medical Prods., Inc., 976 F.2d 248, 249 (5th Cir. 1992) (denying standing to a target manufacturer subject to takeover because the target failed to
show antitrust injury when it alleged loss of independent decision making),
cert. dismissed,510 U.S. 985 (1993).
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have uniformly held that plaintiffs claiming to have lost an advantageous business relationship that they otherwise would
have enjoyed with the acquired or acquiring company lack
standing under section 4.228 Similarly, distributors terminated
when their supplier was driven out of business lacked standing,' 9
as did the employees of a bankrupt airline.2 30 The owner of a
hardware store in a shopping center was denied standing to
challenge a restriction imposed by the center's former "anchor"
grocery store after the its relocation, prohibiting the property
from being leased to another grocery store.23 1 Truck drivers
who hauled General Motors automobiles lacked standing to sue
their employers for an alleged conspiracy with General Motors
employees to divert revenues on which their compensation was
based to an affiliate, because the adverse competitive effects of
the violation were in the market for hauling cars.232 The State
of South Dakota lacked standing to challenge the defendant
railroads' opposition to the construction of a coal slurry pipeline to which the State was to supply water. 233 A lessor of geothermal property lacked standing to challenge an alleged conspiracy of its lessees to suppress the development of steam on

228. See Fischer v. NWA, Inc., 883 F.2d 594, 595 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947 (1990); Alberta Gas Chems. Ltd. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 826 F.2d 1235, 1236 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059
(1988); John Lenore & Co. v. Olympia Brewing Co., 550 F.2d 495, 499 (9th Cir.
1977); cf. G.K.A. Beverage Corp. v. Honickman, 55 F.3d 762, 766 (2d Cir.
1995) (holding that plaintiff did not suffer an antitrust injury when its contract with a supplier was eliminated when the supplier was forced out of
business by the defendant because the injury plaintiff suffered was a derivative injury), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 381 (1995).
229. See G.KA Beverage Corp., 55 F.3d at 762.
230. See Sharp v. United Airlines, Inc., 967 F.2d 404, 409 (10th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 974 (1992).
231. See Henke Enter., Inc. v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., 749 F.2d 488 (8th
Cir. 1984); see also Serfeez v. Jewel Food Stores, 67 F.3d 591, 597 (7th Cir.
1995) (denying standing to shopping mall owner to challenge tenant's alleged
conspiracy when the tenant exercised lease options and then left the rented
space vacant after moving tenant's store to a competitor's mall), cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 1042 (1996); Southhaven Land Co. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 715 F.2d
1079, 1086 (6th Cir. 1983) (denying standing to a lessor of commercial premises for use only as a retail grocery store when the lessor complained that defendant lessee refused to sublease the premises to a grocery store for the purpose of reducing competition with defendant's other stores).
232. See Apperson v. Fleet Carrier Corp., 879 F.2d 1344, 1352 (6th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947 (1990).
233. See South Dakota v. Kansas City S. Indus., 880 F.2d 40, 49 (8th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1023 (1990).
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his land, decreasing his royalties.234 A marine terminal operator lacked standing to challenge a cartelization of the international soda ash industry.2 3 An owner of a football stadium
lacked standing to challenge a restraint on the sale of the stadium's football team tenant, because any denial of refinancing or
other injury to the stadium "was indirect, and a 2consequence
of
36
the direct injury inflicted on the Patriot's owner."
These cases, denying standing to suppliers and others suffering indirect or derivative injury as a result of an antitrust
violation directly impacting consumers or competitors in the
affected market 37 are simply modern applications of the commonlaw proximate-cause principle. That principle was prevalent long
before the Supreme Court's recent attempt to rationalize antitrust standing analysis.
By contrast, where the defendants directly have inflicted
injuries on a nonconsumer, noncompetitor plaintiff as "a fulcrum, conduit or market force to injure competitors or partici238
pants in the relevant product and geographic markets,"
courts (putting aside decisions involving plaintiffs who are unions or employees) generally have upheld the right of the
plaintiff to sue under section 4. In the Crimpers case, UBO and
234. See R. C. Dick Geothermal Corp. v. Thermogenics, Inc., 890 F.2d 139,
1352-53 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
235. See International Raw Materials, Ltd. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 978 F.2d
1318, 1328 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 988 (1993).
236. Sullivan v. Tagliabue, 25 F.3d 43, 51 (1st Cir. 1994).
237. See Arthur S. Langenderfer Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 917 F.2d 1413,
1437-39 (6th Cir. 1990) (denying standing to asphalt producer because the alleged injuries to asphalt paving corporation, its principal customer, were too
indirect), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 899 (1991); Southwest Suburban Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Beverly Area Planning Ass'n, 830 F.2d 1374, 1379 (7th Cir. 1987)
(stating the general rule that "suppliers of an injured customer may not seek
recovery under the antitrust laws" because their injuries are not direct and
too remote) (quoting In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litigation (Bichan), 681
F.2d 514, 519-520 (7th Cir. 1982)); Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., 624 F.2d 1342, 1362 (5th Cir. 1980) (denying standing to creditor
and supplier), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030 (1981); Billy Baxter, Inc. v. CocaCola Co., 431 F.2d 183, 188 (2d Cir. 1970) (denying standing to franchisor of
bottlers of carbonated beverages), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971). But see
Sullivan v. Tagliabue, 25 F.3d 43, 49 n.10 (1st Cir. 1994) (refusing to adopt
automatic rule of exclusion for landlords of directly affected parties); South
Carolina Council of Milk Producers Inc. v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414, 418-19 (4th
Cir. 1966) (granting standing to producers of raw milk to challenge conspiracy
of producer and retailers of processed milk to depress prices), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 934 (1966).
238. Southhaven Land Co., Inc., v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 715 F.2d 1079,
1086 (6th Cir. 1983).
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Showtime targeted the plaintiffs' trade show for elimination because, by placing television programmers and local cable stations in direct contact, it threatened the defendants' business
of assembling cable programming for sale to the stations.
Plaintiffs were in the trade show business, not the cable programming or broadcasting business. Judge Friendly held that
the plaintiffs clearly had suffered "antitrust injury" even
though they were neither consumers nor competitors in the
market for cable programming. The court was
unconvinced that the victim of a successful boycott designed to support a broad policy of market limitation lacks standing under § 4
simply because the boycottee was not a buyer or a seller but was endeavoring to provide a method whereby buyers and sellers could deal
effectively
with each other without paying tribute to the defen9
dants.2

A similar issue was present in Yellow Pages Cost Consultants, Inc. v. GTE Directories Corp.,24 where the plaintiffs were
"cost consultants" who were employed by the buyers of yellowpages advertising to attempt to reduce the costs of their advertising. The plaintiffs alleged that in an effort to preserve their
monopolistic and discriminatory pricing structure, the defendants refused to do business with advertisers through the consultants. Faced with strong circuit authority that only consumers or competitors in the markets restrained by
defendants' conduct have standing under section 4,241 the court
of appeals strained to conclude that the plaintiffs were
"competitors" of the defendants on the basis of "sales pitch"
documents in which the defendants assured their advertisers
that they could provide the same services as the plaintiffs.24 2
In fact, however, the plaintiffs were not competitors of the sellers of yellow pages advertising, but were agents of the purchasers of the advertising. A better ground for sustaining the
standing of the consultants would have been that they were the
"fulcrum or conduit" through which
the defendants sought to
243
achieve their anticompetitive ends.

239. Crimpers Promotions Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 724 F.2d 290, 297
(2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984).
240. 951 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 913 (1992).
241. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text (citing federal appellate
cases that have either absolutely or presumptively limited standing to consumers or competitors).
242. See Yellow Pages Cost Consultants,951 F.2d at 1161.
243. See also Thompson Everett, Inc. v. National Cable Advertising, L.P.,
57 F.3d 1317, 1325 (4th Cir. 1995).
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In Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc.,2'
the court sustained the standing of a nonconsumer, noncompetitor hospital to challenge the defendant's denial of its status
as a contracting provider, which placed it at a disadvantage
with competing hospitals, even though defendant's conduct was
alleged to be aimed at restraining the market for health care
financing. The court stated that under Blue Shield of Virginia
v. McCready,245 "an antitrust plaintiff need not necessarily be a
competitor or consumer" in the restrained markets. 4 6 The
plaintiff had standing because its injuries were an "integral
aspect" of the conspiracy to restrain the health care financing
247
market.
As suggested by the previous discussion, the refusal of
these cases to limit antitrust standing only to consumers or
competitors in the affected markets was correct. Where the defendant directly inflicts an injury on the plaintiff as a means of
achieving its anticompetitive ends, there is no violation of the
background principle of proximate cause underlying section 4.
Because plaintiffs injuries are directly inflicted, there is also
no basis for the denial of standing based on the inherent
speculativeness of the plaintiffs damages. Of course, if the
plaintiff cannot prove its damages with the requisite certainty,24 8 its claims should fail, but they should fail on the
merits, not for lack of standing.
In such cases, there is also no violation of the core Brunswick principle prohibiting recovery of damages resulting from
competition itself. Nor, in the typical case, is there any likelihood of duplicative recovery (or complex apportionment) of the
same damages, contrary to the Illinois Brick rule. The plaintiffs do not seek to recover for all or part of an overcharge paid
by consumers in the restrained markets. Rather, they seek recovery for lost profits and other damages that the defendants
have inflicted on the intermediaries' businesses in an effort to
implement their anticompetitive scheme. The plaintiffs, as the
direct victims of defendants' anticompetitive conduct, have suffered the most obvious injuries and have the greatest incentive
to sue. Permitting them to do so would further the deterrent

244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

899 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1005 (1990).
457 U.S. 465 (1982).
Reazin, 899 F.2d at 963.
Id.
See supra notes 209-210 and accompanying text.
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purpose of section 4. As previously discussed, the existence of
other consumer or competitor plaintiffs who hypothetically
might sue should not deprive directly injured intermediaries of
the standing that they would otherwise possess.249 Nor can the
denial of section 4 standing to the intermediaries in such cases
be justified by any supportable view that they are outside the
"zone of interests" protected by section 4.250
Decisions in the labor field have nevertheless declined to
recognize section 4 standing in such cases. For example, in
Lucas v. Bechtel Corp.,251 the Ninth Circuit held that union
employees lacked standing to challenge an alleged conspiracy
between their employer and their international union to depress their wages as a means of monopolizing the market for
the construction of nuclear power plants, on the ground that
Bechtel's competitors were the direct victims. In Sacramento
Valley v. InternationalBrotherhoodof Electrical Workers,252 the
same court held that the union lacked standing to challenge a
conspiracy among members of an electrical contractors association to depress wages below prevailing union levels and
drive out employers who contracted with the union, on the
ground that it was not clear that the union's interests, which
were protected by a separate body of labor law, would be served
by increased competition.
Although it is possible that the conduct in question in
these cases may have been protected by the nonstatutory labor
exemption as currently interpreted by the Supreme Court to
encompass the activities of single employers or multiemployer
bargaining associations that are permissible under the federal
labor laws,253 the court's decision on the standing point is
questionable.
Under clear authority, direct employer restraints on the labor market are subject to challenge under the
Sherman Act.254 That being the case, the fact that the restraints are alleged to have been part of a broader anticompetitive scheme directed at restraining product markets should
have no bearing on the injured employees' standing to sue.

249. See supra notes 218-226 and accompanying text.
250. See supra Part II.D (describing the zone of interest test).
251.

800 F.2d 839 (9th Cir. 1986).

252. 888 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1989).
253. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2116, 2127 (1996).
254. See, e.g., Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 452 (1957); Nichols v.
Spencer Intl Press, Inc., 371 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1967).
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A different issue is presented by cases that do not involve
conspiracies to restrain the labor market, but in which employees are terminated for refusing to implement a restraint on the
product market. In the leading Bichan decision denying
standing to an employee who alleged he was terminated as the
manager of defendants' industrial gas division because he refused to participate in a conspiracy to fix prices and allocate
customers, the Seventh Circuit read Brunswick to stand for the
proposition that section 4 "protects only those persons injured
as consumers or competitors in a defined market."25 5 The court
stated that it was "convinced that in fashioning the antitrust
laws Congress was concerned with competition, not employee
coercion ... ,"256 but it did not explain why employee coercion
that is alleged to have been the essential means of implementing an anticompetitive scheme should be deemed to be beyond
the area of congressional concern. As previously discussed, the
court's rationale confuses the ultimate consumer welfare objectives of the antitrust laws with
the remedies that Congress
25 7
provided to achieve those goals.
The Bichan court also expressed concern that recognition
of standing in employee coercion cases would result in
"overkill" and a "flood" of antitrust litigation, suggesting the
possibility of "excessive" deterrence if nonconsumer and noncompetitor plaintiffs were permitted to sue. 8 This, however,
was hyperbole. The cases cited at the outset of this section
show that most antitrust actions commenced by nonconsumer,
noncompetitor plaintiffs have been and will continue to be
screened out by the background principle of proximate cause.
The Bichan court did not explain why recovery for injuries directly inflicted on employee intermediaries as a means of implementing defendant's anticompetitive objectives should be
viewed as "overkill." Such cases present no possibility of unbounded and disproportionate treble damages for all of the
"ripples of harm" that an antitrust violation might cause in the
economy. Rather, they are confined to clearly foreseeable injuries that the defendant directly and intentionally inflicted on
the plaintiff in pursuit of its anticompetitive ends.

255. In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litigation (Bichan), 681 F.2d 514, 51920 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1016 (1983).
256. Id. at 519.
257. See supra part I.D.
258. 681 F.2d at 519-20.
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Perhaps the court meant to confine its analysis only to intermediary cases involving employees who, it assumed, would
be able to recover damages under state wrongful discharge law.
Here again, however, the court did not explain why the availability of state tort or contract remedies for wrongful discharge
should preclude an antitrust remedy for nonconsumer and
noncompetitor plaintiffs, any more than the existence of alternative state tort and contract remedies does in cases involving
consumer or competitor plaintiffs.
Although Bichan represents the prevailing view in cases
involving employees who have been discharged for refusing to
implement an anticompetitive scheme, 25 9 the Ninth Circuit in
Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co.,26 reached the opposite conclusion
on the ground that "no conspiracy to fix prices or allocate customers [could] be effective without the cooperation of the responsible employees." 2 1 Discharge of the resisting employees
was thus "essential to [the] success of the scheme." 2 2 On remand for consideration in light of AGCC, the court reaffirmed
its decision on the ground that Ostrofe's injury was an integral
part of the defendant's anticompetitive scheme, and because no
one else had as strong an incentive "to vindicate the public interest in antitrust enforcement."263 Ostrofe is clearly the minority view and has since been confined to its facts even in the
Ninth Circuit.2

259. See also Fallis v. Pendleton Woolen Mills, Inc., 866 F.2d 209, 212 (6th
Cir. 1989) (holding that sales representative terminated for failure to implement vertical price fixing conspiracy lacked standing on the ground, inter alia,
that his injuries were only "incidental"), disapproved on other grounds by
Humphreys v. Bellaine Corp., 966 F.2d 1037, 1042 (6th Cir. 1992); Gallant v.
BOC Group, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 202, 208 (D. Mass. 1995) (holding that sales
representative terminated for oral and written complaints to supervisor concerning alleged antitrust violations lacked standing to bring a federal antitrust claim against his employer); Thomason v. Mitsubishi Elec. Sales Am.,
Inc., 701 F. Supp. 1563, 1569-70 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (holding a regional sales
manager terminated for failure to enforce illegal price maintenance policies
lacked antitrust standing).
260. 670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated, 460 U.S. 1007 (1983), on remand, 740 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. dismissed, 469 U.S. 1200 (1985).
261. Id. at 1384.
262. Id.
263. Ostrofe, 740 F.2d at 746 (quoting AGCC, 459 U.S. 519, 542 (1983).
264. See Vinci v. Waste Management, Inc., 80 F.3d 1372, 1376-77 (9th Cir.
1996) (limiting Ostrofe to cases in which the plaintiffs participation is
"essential" to the scheme, the dismissal is a "necessary means," and the
plaintiff has the best incentive to challenge the violation).
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This Article argues that the availability of a section 4 remedy to those directly injured as a means of implementing an
anticompetitive scheme should not turn on their status as consumers or competitors in the affected markets, or the existence
of other hypothetical plaintiffs or remedies under state law.
This, however, does not necessarily mean that Ostrofe rather
than the weight of authority represented by Bichan was correctly decided. The background principle of proximate cause is
sufficiently flexible to screen out cases in which the plaintiff's
injuries, although arguably "direct" in some sense, were not the
essential means by which the defendant sought to achieve its
anticompetitive objectives. In such cases, the plaintiffs injuries were a by-product of the defendant's scheme. Therefore,
the policies of fairness and deterrence of wrongdoing that inform a flexible standing analysis grounded
in proximate cause
26 5
principles were implicated less strongly.
Perhaps for these reasons, a panel of the Ninth Circuit recently limited Ostrofe to cases in which the plaintiff employee's
participation was "essential" to effectuate the defendant's anticompetitive objectives. 266 Unlike intermediary cases such as
Crimpers and Yellow Pages, in which the defendant could not
have implemented its restraint without injuring the plaintiffs,
one could argue that the participation of any particular em265. The conclusion that the plaintiffs injuries were only the incidental byproduct, rather than the essential instrument of the defendants' scheme, appears to underlie a number of decisions denying standing to agents and brokers who are not consumers or competitors in the markets restrained by the
defendants' conduct. Thus, standing was denied to a motion picture licensing
agent who claimed that an exhibitor customer had entered into a film allocation agreement with another exhibitor, whose agent had, as a consequence,
replaced the plaintiff. See Exhibitors' Serv., Inc. v. American Multi-Cinema,
Inc., 788 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1986). The plaintiffs injury was viewed as only
"indirect and derivative." See id. at 579. An apple juice distributor that
claimed it was terminated for failing to implement a discriminatory discount
to a preferred buyer lacked standing. See Gregory Mktg Corp. v. Wakefern
Food Corp., 787 F.2d 92 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 821 (1986). After
arguing that the plaintiff lacked standing because it was neither a consumer
nor a competitor in the affected market and its injuries did not reflect the anticompetitive effect of the violation, the court observed that the plaintiffs
participation was not essential to carry out the discriminatory pricing scheme,
which the defendant could have accomplished without involving a broker. See
id. at 95-97. The plaintiffs injuries were "incidental." See id. at 97. Standing
was also denied to a snack food broker that was terminated as part of a plan
by the defendant to induce other brokers to relinquish their relationship with
competing manufacturers by offering them the plaintiffs business. See BodieRickett & Assocs. v. Mars, Inc., 957 F.2d 287, 292 (1992).
266. See Vinci, 80 F.3d at 1376-77 (9th Cir. 1996).
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ployee is not critical to a business's ability to effectuate a vertical or horizontal price fixing conspiracy. A defendant could alter its job descriptions or its organizational structure to eliminate the involvement of the plaintiff altogether without
violating any law. On the other hand, the result in Ostrofe
could be supported on the ground that the cooperation of some
employee is always necessary to the implementation of a pricefixing scheme. In many cases, perhaps no other potential
plaintiff would have as great or as focused an incentive to enforce the antitrust laws. If no antitrust remedy were available,
the employee would have an incentive to remain silent, thus
creating the mechanism by which the violation is committed.
As in proximate cause analysis generally, distinguishing
cases in which a nonconsumer and noncompetitor plaintiffs
injuries are the direct and instrumental means of an antitrust
violation from those in which they are the indirect effects or
incidental by-products of the violation inevitably will pose difficulties in some cases. Consider, for example, the dischargedemployee cases just discussed. Or consider SAS of Puerto Rico,
Inc. v. Puerto Rico Telephone Company.2 67 The plaintiff obtained a contract with the Puerto Rican Telephone Company
(PRTC), a subsidiary of the Puerto Rico Telephone Authority,
to upgrade PRTC's equipment by installing "intelligent" pay
phones that would facilitate long-distance calls and make it
easier for callers to select alternative long-distance carriers
rather than the predesignated carrier for the phone. The predesignated long distance carrier for almost all of the phones
was another subsidiary of the Authority. After the contract
was entered, the Authority sold a controlling interest in the
long-distance subsidiary to another company. Plaintiffs complaint alleged that, in an attempt to maintain the value of the
sale, PRTC breached the plaintiffs contract to provide enhanced pay phone service that would facilitate the selection of
alternative carriers.
The First Circuit held that SAS had not suffered antitrust
injury because its injuries were only the incidental by-product
of those suffered directly by customers and competitors in the
268
allegedly monopolized pay phone and long distance markets.
The Court analogized the plaintiffs injury to that suffered by
suppliers to the victim of an alleged antitrust violation, who

267. 48 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 1995).
268. See id. at 44-45.
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are denied antitrust standing because their injuries are indirect and derivative of those suffered by the victims themselves.
In SAS, the plaintiff was a supplier of the violator rather than
a supplier of the victim, but the same result should obtain. Although PRTC breached its agreement to use SAS as a supplier,
"if the breach played a part in an antitrust violation, the conduct itself was an antitrust violation because of the anticompetitive threat posed to other potential plaintiffs, not SAS.
Like the happenstance supplier to a customer felled by a viola269
tion, SAS was coincidentally involved."
The court concluded that the "presumptively proper"
plaintiff would be a telephone consumer or a competitor who
sought to serve the market. The court added that the "most
obvious" reason for conferring standing on a nonconsumer/noncompetitor plaintiff would be that "there may be no
first best with the incentive or ability to sue,"2 0' but that in
SAS, directly injured long distance competitors would have
ample incentive to challenge the violation alleged. "Ifthere is
any other reason for stretching to confer standing in this case
on an incidentally connected plaintiff like SAS, it does not occur to us."271 The court reinforced its conclusion by noting that
any injury to the plaintiff was speculative. Even if the antitrust laws imposed a duty on PRTC to upgrade its pay phones,
it need not have employed SAS to do the upgrading. Moreover,
SAS would have suffered the same injury from the contract
breach whether or not an antitrust violation had occurred. 72
The result in SAS was undoubtedly correct. Antitrust
courts consistently have recognized that the link between antitrust policy and the failure of suppliers to make profits they
would have realized if no violation had occurred is too tenuous
to support supplier standing. Arguably, SAS presented a
somewhat stronger argument for standing than the usual
supplier case, because once SAS had received the pay-phone
upgrade contract, the breach of that contract was in some
sense "necessary" to permit the defendant to maintain the
dominance of its long-distance afilate. However, the nature of
a supplier's injuries and their relationship to antitrust policy
does not differ materially as between a plaintiff who never ob-

269. Id. at 44.

270. Id. at 45.
271. Id.
272. See id. at 44.
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tained a beneficial contract that it would otherwise have received and one who obtained such a contract but ultimately
failed to reap its rewards.
One may agree with the result in SAS without endorsing
its broader rationale that nonconsumer and noncompetitor antitrust plaintiffs should never have standing unless the court
concludes that there is no consumer or competitor plaintiff
with the incentive or ability to sue. There is a material difference, from the standpoint of antitrust policy, between plaintiffs
such as those in Crimpers and Yellow Pages whose injuries are
the essential means by which an antitrust violation is accomplished, and plaintiffs such as those in SAS whose injuries are
an incidental by-product of a violation. In cases falling within
the former category, there is no basis in the language, history,
or background proximate cause and zone of interests principles
informing the interpretation of section 4 for rejecting the
plaintiff's standing, even assuming that injured consumers or
competitors also may sue. As previously discussed, moreover,
the conclusion that other consumer or competitor plaintiffs who
have not sued will be more effective antitrust enforcers than
the plaintiffs who have actually done so often is entirely
speculative. 73
The approach suggested here, involving, as it does, all of
the uncertainties of the "slippery rubric[] "27 of proximate
cause, admittedly presents greater difficulties of application
than would a bright line rule excluding all nonconsumer and
noncompetitor plaintiffs from the protection of the antitrust
laws. When are a plaintiffs injuries more properly viewed as
indirect, derivative, or incidental, rather than direct, essential,
and instrumental? 275 As illustrated by the persistence of
proximate cause analysis in the law of torts generally, however, neither the difficulty of that line drawing process nor the
uncertainties it may create in particular cases support its replacement by a categorical principle that would deny standing
273. See supra text accompanying notes 218-226.
274. See SAS, 48 F.3d at 43.
275. See HyPoint Tech., Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 949 F.2d 874, 875-76
(6th Cir. 1991) (describing challenge by seller of service contracts for HewlettPackard equipment, which it filled using service offered by HP, to HP's termination of its "four hour response" guarantee except for customers who purchased service contracts from HP); General Indus. Corp. v. Hartz Mountain
Corp., 810 F.2d 795, 798-800 (8th Cir. 1987) (describing pet supply broker
terminated by the defendant because it promoted pet supplies that competed
with those of the defendant).
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to nonconsumers and noncompetitors in all private antitrust
actions. Even if a rule limiting antitrust standing to consumers and competitors would be superior as a matter of legislative
policy, it is not the rule that Congress adopted in section 4.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER UNRESOLVED
STANDING ISSUES
An approach focused on traditional proximate cause concepts also sheds light on several difficult standing issues presented by the suits of market participants who arguably have
benefited from the price-enhancing or output-reducing effects
of the defendants' conduct. For example, a number of cases
have recognized the standing of members of a cartel to sue
276
their co-conspirators for damages and injunctive relief.
Based on a narrow reading of Brunswick, one could argue that
standing should be denied in such cases because the plaintiffs
were the beneficiaries of the higher prices and limited output
resulting from their participation in the cartel. This argument
should be rejected on its own terms, however, because as
pointed out in the Second Circuit's decision in the Volvo case,
"[tihe interests of the cartel as a whole often diverge substantially from the interests of individual members," and, "to the
extent a cartel member credibly asserts that it would be better
off if it were free to compete.., we believe that the individual
2 77
cartel member satisfies the antitrust injury requirement."
Thus, a substantial argument can be made that cartel participants would suffer at least prospective injury from the output

276. See Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma v. NCAA, 707
F.2d 1147, 1152 (10th Cir. 1983) (upholding standing of NCAA members to
challenge the NCAA's television plan limiting the telecasts of college football
games), affd on other grounds, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Volvo North Am. Corp. v.
Men's Int'l Profl Tennis Council, 857 F.2d 55, 68 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding that
owners of men's professional tennis events regulated by the MIPTC had
standing to challenge restrictions on the events even though they were participants in the MIPTC); see also Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n. v.
NFL, 791 F.2d 1356, 1365 (9th Oir. 1986) (upholding standing of both the
Coliseum and the Los Angeles Raiders to recover treble damages against the
NFL), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 826 (1987); Chicago Profl Sports Ltd. Partnership
v. NBA, 754 F. Supp. 1336, 1355 (N.D. IL 1991) (holding that both team and
television station had standing to challenge NBA decision to reduce the number of televised games), affd on other grounds, 961 F. 2d 667 (7th Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 954 (1992). But see Blackburn v. Sweeney, 53 F.3d 825,
830 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding party to illegal territorial allocation barred from
seeking injunctive relief and damages).
277. See Volvo, 857 F.2d at 67-68.
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restraining aspects of the conspiracy entitling them to injunctive relief, even if retrospective damages should be denied. The
standing of the would-be cartel breaker should in any event be
recognized under the argument advanced here. Restraints on
the cartel's participants are the direct and essential means by
which the cartel's anticompetitive objectives are achieved. The
objection that upholding standing in such cases would allow
cartel members to obtain damages based on their inability to
sell independently under the "price umbrella" erected by the
cartel should be rejected. To the extent that the cartel participants do not bear "substantially equal responsibility" for the
violation that would bar recovery under what remains of the in
pari delicto defense after Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International PartsCorp.,278 the correct measure of damages in such a
case would be the profits that the plaintiff would have realized
in an unrestrained market, not those the plaintiff would have
realized as a result of the cartel's anticompetitive activities.
The suggested approach would similarly uphold the
standing of distributors terminated for failing to adhere to a
program of resale price maintenance. In Local Beauty Supply,
Inc. v. LamaurInc.,279 the Seventh Circuit rejected the standing of
such a distributor on the ground that it had not suffered
"antitrust injury." The court of appeals reasoned that the
plaintiff claimed damages resulting from its inability to undercut the price umbrella erected by the defendant and that the
plaintiff should not receive damages for its "inability to continue to profit" from the violation. 28° Under the suggested
analysis, the standing of the restrained distributor would be
upheld regardless of whether the distributor directly had suffered from the "anticompetitive effect" of the violation, because
the restraint on the distributor was the direct and essential
means by which the defendant achieved its anticompetitive
ends. As in the case of conspirators seeking to break a cartel,
however, damages would be limited to any increase in profitability that the plaintiff could have achieved in an unrestrained market, and would not allow the plaintiff to reap the

278. 392 U.S. 134 (1968); see Blackburn, 53 F.3d at 829-830 (holding that
cartel participant bearing equal responsibility for violation was barred from
recovery); In re Mid-Atlantic Toyota Antitrust Litig., 516 F. Supp. 1287, 12951296 (D. Md. 1981) (stating that Perma Life does not permit recovery by a
plaintiff who bears "substantially equal responsibility" for the violation).
279. 787 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1986).
280. Id. at 1202-03.
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benefits of the anticompetitive pricing structure maintained by
the defendant. 21' The Supreme Court implicitly accepted this
282
argument in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co.,
where the Court, in rejecting the standing of competitors of a
distributor to challenge maximum vertical price fixing, stated
that the
restrained dealers themselves would be entitled to
3
sue.

28

Finally, the suggested analysis would recognize the
standing of takeover targets to challenge anticompetitive
mergers-an issue that has generated much controversy and a
conflict of authority in the courts of appeals .2 4 A recent
analysis persuasively argues that the standing of the target
should be recognized on policy grounds, despite the argument
that the target ultimately would benefit from the priceenhancing effects of the illegal merger.28 5 This Article reaches
the same conclusion on the different ground that there is no
principled basis on which the language of section 4 can be interpreted to deny standing to the target, whose demise is the
essential means by which the defendant seeks to achieve its
unlawful objectives.
V. OPTIMAL DETERRENCE THEORY RECONSIDERED
A "consumer-competitor" limitation on antitrust standing
ultimately must be grounded on the policy-based standing theory of "optimal" economic deterrence,28 6 under which even injured consumers and competitors would be denied standing if
they have not directly felt the ultimate price-enhancing or outputrestricting effects of the defendant's violation. There is, however, no basis for attributing such a restricted reading-based

281. See, e.g., Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum, 791 F.2d at 1366
(concluding that antitrust damages must be offset by any benefit resulting
from the violation).
282. 495 U.S. 328 (1990).
283. See id. at 345.
284. Compare Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.AL, 871 F.2d
252, 259 (2d Cir. 1989) (upholding standing of takeover target), modified, 890
F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. dismissed, 492 U.S. 939 (1989), with Anago, Inc.
v. Tecnol Med. Prods., Inc., 976 F.2d 248, 250-51 (5th Cir. 1992) (denying
standing), cert. dismissed, 510 U.S. 985 (1993).
285. See Brodley, supra note 88, at 78-106 (concluding that takeover targets should have standing to ensure effective private enforcement despite
possible divergence between their private incentives and public goals).
286. See supra text accompanying notes 20-23 (discussing "optimal deterrence").
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as it is on microeconomic theories developed over half a century
after enactment of section 4-to the Congress that enacted the
Sherman and Clayton Acts. For example, Congress provided
that violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act are felonies,287 and there is no reason to believe that Congress intended that any "optimal" level of felony offenses should take
place. Furthermore, section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that
the damages award in civil actions for violations of the antitrust
laws shall be trebled, 8 a punitive, deterrent-based provision inconsistent with the idea that Congress in 1914 contemplated any
precisely calibrated limitation of antitrust damages to the
amount deemed "optimal" by modern economic theory. Proponents of the "optimal deterrence" standing theory have attempted to rationalize the treble-damages provision as a rough
adjustment for the risk of nondetection, 219 but offer no reason
to think that trebling bears any empirical relationship at all to
that risk, or that Congress ever thought that it did (or even
considered the question) when it enacted section 4.290
Yet another difficulty is that the optimal deterrence theory
is based on the theory of social cost, under which all real economic costs caused by a particular activity should be taken into
account in determining its optimal level. 291 In many cases of
the kind considered here, the damages to the intermediary may
not precisely reflect the price-enhancing or output-reducing effects of the defendants' conduct, but they are real social costs
that should be included in the optimal deterrence calculus.
Their losses are directly linked to the anticompetitive effects of
the violations, and are not in any way derivative or duplicative
of losses suffered by others. Moreover, their injuries are not
the unavoidable by-product of a net overall social gain resulting from an expansion of output caused by increased competition by the defendant. Thus, the denial of standing in the
287. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1994).
288. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).
289. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 20, at 1158 & n-10; Page, supra
note 20, at 1455.
290. Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, DetreblingAntitrust Damages, 28 J.L. &
ECON. 445, 455 (1985) ("None of this tells us whether the right multiplier is
1.5, 3, or 10.").
291. See R.H. Coase, The Problemof Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1960)
("I propose to start my analysis by examining a case in which most economists
would presumably agree that the problem would be solved in a completely
satisfactory manner: when the damaging business has to pay for all damage
caused and the pricing system works smoothly.... .") (first emphasis added).
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Brunswick case, 92 where the plaintiffs claimed damages were
simply the result of increased competition by the defendant,
hardly suggests that intermediaries whose damages are the essential instrument of a defendant's output-restricting conduct
should lack standing, or that the costs those injuries reflect
should be ignored in any "optimal deterrence" calculus.
The optimal deterrence theory is also difficult to reconcile
with a host of settled antitrust doctrines in standing and related areas. For example, it arguably would deny standing to a
distributor subjected to maximum or minimum resale price
maintenance,29 3 notwithstanding the Supreme Court's clear
and recent recognition in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co.294 that "[i]f such a scheme causes ... anticompetitive
consequences... consumers and the manufacturers' own dealers may bring suit."295 Similarly, competitors excluded from
the market by an illegal tying arrangement would be denied
standing, contrary to settled authority, 296 as would the victim
of a proven but unsuccessful predatory pricing scheme who
manages to survive.2 97 And even if this draconian standing
hurdle were surmounted, proponents of the theory have argued, in the face of settled authority to the contrary,2 98 that
292. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489
(1977).
293. See, e.g., Page, supra note 20, at 1469-1470.
294. 495 U.S. 328 (1990).
295. 495 U.S. at 345.
296. See, e.g., Thompson v. Metropolitan Multi-List, Inc., 934 F.2d 1566,
1572 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 903 (1992). The principal Supreme Court private-right-of-action decision considering tying arrangements
arose in the context of a suit by an excluded competitor. See Jefferson Parish
Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2,5 (1984).
297. See Page, supra note 20, at 1475, 1481.
298. See Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S.
555, 561-563 (1931) (allowing recovery of lost profits despite uncertainty as to
amount); H.J., Inc. v. IT&T Corp., 867 F.2d 1531, 1549 (8th Cir. 1989) ("[The
proper measure of damages is the present value of profits lost as a result

of... [defendants] improper actions, specifically its predatory pricing.");
Farley Transp. Co. v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 786 F.2d 1342, 1350-51 (9th
Cir. 1985) (recognizing lost profits as proper measure of damages in predatory
pricing claim but disallowing such an award because of plaintiffs failure to
present sufficient evidence of lost profits); MCI Communications Corp. v.
AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1166 (7th Cir. 1983) (remanding for partial new
trial on the issue of damages because plaintiff inaccurately computed lost
profits), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); King & King Enter. v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 657 F.2d 1147, 1158 (10th Cir. 1981) (finding that estimated lost
profits due to defendant's predatory pricing were a reasonable assessment of
antitrust damages), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982); Union Carbide & Car-
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firms driven from the market by an antitrust violation should
not be able to recover their lost profits, because those profits do
not precisely reflect the "anticompetitive effect" (i.e., monopolistic prices or the dead weight loss) of the violation.2 99
To a considerable extent, these suggested standing limitations reflect underlying economic hostility to the existence and
rationale of the antitrust violations themselves. Criticism of
the per se prohibition against resale price maintenance and
certain tying arrangements, and to antitrust liability based on
predatory pricing theories, has been prevalent among scholars
who view the antitrust laws though the lens of allocative efficiency. 00 Even if their position regarding the substantive
bon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 595 (10th Cir. 1962) (acknowledging that
lost profits are proper measure of damages and upholding award despite uncertainty as to amount of damages), cert. dismissed, 371 U.S. 801 (1962);
Northeastern Tel. Co. v. AT&T Co., 651 F.2d 76, 95 & n.30 (2d Cir. 1981)
(recognizing that both damages to ongoing concern value and lost profits could
be awarded in the same action), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 943 (1982).
299. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 290, at 462-63.
300. On tying, see Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2,
35 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The time has therefore come to abandon
the !perse' label and refocus the inquiry on the adverse economic effects, and
the potential economic benefits, that the tie may have."); RICHARD A. POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN EcONOMIC PERSPECTVE 181 (1976) (suggesting the legalization of tie-ins because "there is something seriously wrong about a doctrine under which virtually every combination sale is prima facie an unlawful
tie-in that the seller may have to convince a jury is cost justified"); Frank H.
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEYx L. REV.1, 10 (1984) ("As time
goes by, fewer and fewer things seem appropriate for per se condemnation.").
On predatory pricing, see POSNER, supra, at 195-199 (doubting that predatory
pricing is an effective method of monopolization, because it is likely to delay,
rather than prevent, new entries into the market); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies,48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 264-65
(1981) (deeming predatory pricing unlikely to succeed in the marketplace and
concluding that the predatory pricing cause of action should be eliminated).
On resale price fixing, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48
U. CHI. L. REV. 886, 890 & n.20 (1981) (arguing that maximum resale price
fixing should be allowed, especially in context of exclusive dealer territories);
cf Digital Equip. Corp. v. Uniq Digital Tech., Inc., 73 F.3d 756, 761 (7th Cir.
1996) (Easterbrook, J.) (finding superfluous claim that computer manufacturer was engaged in tying by sending operating system with each new computer sold); Israel Travel Advisory Serv., Inc., v. Israel Identity Tours, Inc., 61
F.3d 1250, 1256 (7th Cir. 1995) (Easterbrook, J.) (refusing to find violation
under predatory pricing theory when defendant did not have dominant position in land tours market), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1847 (1996); United States
v. Heffernan, 43 F.3d 1144, 1145-46 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, J.) ("These violations-the core per se offenses that no (well, very few) economists believe can
be justified-are comprised of 'restrictive agreements among competitors,
such as horizontal price-fixing (including bid rigging) and horizontal marketallocation.'") (citation omitted); Hardy v. City Optical, Inc., 39 F.3d 765, 767
(7th Cir. 1994) (Posner, J.) (noting Seventh Circuit's heightened requirement
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scope of the antitrust laws is accepted, however, it has to date
received only partial endorsement by the Supreme Court. °1
The accepted rationale for the prohibition against resale price
fixing-that it "substitut[es] the perhaps erroneous judgment
of a seller for the forces of the competitive market [and] may
severely intrude upon the ability of buyers to compete and
survive in that market,"3 0 2 -remains unaltered and was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in its most recent decision on the
subject.3 °3 That being the case, it is illogical that a dealer
whose discretion has been constrained, and who therefore has
suffered the very impact of the practice that has led to its condemnation, should lack "standing" to sue as some proponents
of the "optimal deterrence" theory have suggested. Even if this
were not obvious from the rationale of the underlying antitrust
violation itself, there would be no basis for ascribing such a
crabbed view of the broad language of section 4 to the Congress
that enacted the Clayton Act in 1914.
Similarly, the accepted rationale for the antitrust prohibition of certain tying arrangements remains that they constrain
the competitive freedom of the dealers subjected to them, and
unfairly foreclose the ability of sellers of the tied product to
compete based on the price and quality of their goods 30- - a rationale unaltered by the Supreme Court's recent refinement
30 5
and restriction of the scope of the per se rule against tying.
Given that rationale, the conclusion that Congress, in enacting
that a tying agreement is not actionable unless the defendant has substantial
market power in the tying product); Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d
1430, 1438 (7th Cir. 1986) (Posner, J.) (f[T]he rationale of the per se rule
against resale price maintenance, .. . is unclear.") (citations omitted).
301. See Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509
U.S. 209, 222 (1993) (reaffirming the availability of predatory pricing theories
under certain circumstances); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co.,
495 U.S. 328, 336-39 (1990) (reaffrming the per se prohibition against resale
price fixing); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15 (1984)
(reaffirming the per se prohibition of tying arrangements under certain circumstances).
302. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152 (1968).
303. See Atlantic Richfield, 495 U.S. at 345.
304. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958). In
that case the Court stated:
They deny competitors free access to the market for the tied product,
not because the party imposing the tying requirements has a better
product or a lower price but because of his power or leverage in another market. At the same time buyersare forced to forego their free
choice between competing products.
Id.
305. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15 (1984).
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section 4, intended to deny standing to competitors who have
been unable to sell or buyers who have been unable to choose
other goods because of the tie is baseless. And, in predatory
pricing cases, the legislative history of the antitrust laws
themselves demonstrates beyond any possible question that
the victims of alleged predation were the special objects of
Congressional concern." 6 Modern doubts about the wisdom of
predatory pricing theories hardly suggest that the Congresses
that enacted the Sherman and Clayton Acts in 1890 and 1914
subscribed to those doubts, or would have denied the victim of
predation standing to recover lost profits because the defendant's predatory scheme ultimately failed.
Finally, while application of traditional proximate
cause/direct injury analysis may present difficulties in particular cases, as illustrated by conflict of authority in the discharged-employee cases, courts have long been accustomed to
dealing with such problems. The complex analyses that have
resulted from attempts to apply the optimal deterrence theory
to the gamut of potential violations, 30 7 and the lack of agreement on proper application of the theory even among its proponents, 3 8 belie its ease of application. Adoption of the theory

306. See 51 CONG. REc. 9069 (1914) (statement of Rep. Edwin Y. Webb)
(noting that section 2 of the Clayton Act aimed at preventing price discrimination "if such discriminating sale is made with the purpose or intent to destroy or wrongfully injure the business of a competitor of either such purchaser or seller"), reprinted in 2 KINTNER, supra note 113, at 1184; 51 CONG.
REC. 9260 (1914) (statement of Rep. Daniel J. McGillicuddy) ("It is a fact that
to kill competition trusts have often reduced prices below the cost of production. Under the bill which we propose this unfair system of price discrimination will be abolished."), reprinted in 2 KINTNER, supra note 113, at 1363; 51
CONG. REC. 9265 (1914) (statement of Rep. Dick T. Morgan) (suggesting that
predatory pricing was the heart of section 2 of the proposed bill and arguing
that coverage should extend beyond predatory pricing), reprinted in 2
KINTNER, supra note 113, at 1374; 51 CONG. REC. 16316 (1914) (statement of
Rep. Edwin Y. Webb) ("[W]hat we have really done and tried to do by this bill
is to make unlawful discriminations in prices."), reprintedin 3 KINTNER, supra note 113, at 2832; see also, S. REP. No. 698, at 43 (1914) (statement of
Hon. Charles A. Culberson, Chairman Sen. Judiciary Committee) (noting that
section 2 was designed to allow cause of action for anyone injured by price discrimination "with the purpose and intent thereby to destroy or wrongfully injure the business of a competitor"), reprinted in 2 KINTNER, supra note 113,
at 1746.
307. See, e.g., Page, supra note 20 (applying "optimal deterrence" rationale to
antitrust standing analysis).
308. Compare Page, supra note 20, at 1495, with Frank H. Easterbrook,
Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies,48 U. Cm. L. REv. 263, 326-27
(1981) (disagreeing on recovery of lost "going concern value" under the
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would result in the rejection of established antitrust standing
rules, 30 9 and threaten to convert the preliminary standing inquiry into a battle of economic experts on the implications of
modern price and "optimal deterrence" theory. Here again,
there is no suggestion that the Congresses that enacted the
Sherman and Clayton Acts at the turn of the century had any
such refinements in mind. Rather, their intent was for the
courts to apply the judicially developed proximate cause concepts with which they were already familiar to screen out
plaintiffs whose injuries were incidental, derivative, or remote.
CONCLUSION
A limitation on antitrust standing only to consumers and
competitors in the market restrained by the defendant's conduct might be appropriate had Congress delegated authority to
the judiciary to develop the scope of the section 4 remedy as a
matter of federal common law. As an exercise in the interpretation of section 4, however, it lacks any principled basis. Such
a limitation fails to explain decisions that recognize the
standing of nonconsumers and noncompetitors to maintain an
antitrust challenge where they are the essential fulcrum, conduit, or means by which the defendant seeks to achieve its anticompetitive ends.
Section 4 must be read against the background commonlaw principle of proximate cause. That principle is focused on
the directness or indirectness of the plaintiffs injuries, and the
intent with which the defendant acted, not on the plaintiffs
status as consumer or competitor in the markets affected by
the defendant's conduct. The section 4 remedy also is properly
restricted to the "zone of interests" which Congress intended to
protect. Here again, however, there is no substantial basis on
which to conclude that Congress meant to exclude intermediaries
whose injuries are the essential means by which the defendant
violates the antitrust laws from the protection of section 4.
The existence of other plaintiffs who might have sued but
did not, or the availability of alternative remedies under "other
laws" such as the federal labor laws or state common law,
should not in themselves preclude the standing of directly injured intermediaries, any more than the existence of other potential plaintiffs or common-law remedies would justify denying
"optimal deterrence" theory).
309. See supra text accompanying notes 293-299 (detailing conflicts between "optimal deterrence" theory and established antitrust doctrine).
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standing to consumers or competitors in the markets affected
by the defendant's conduct. The existence of other plaintiffs or
other remedies at the most serves an illustrative function, perhaps suggesting that the plaintiffs injuries are only the indirect result or incidental consequence of the defendant's conduct.
Although most nonmarket participants may lack standing
under the background proximate cause principle because their
injuries are the indirect, derivative, or incidental result of the
defendant's conduct, others whose injuries are the instrument
by which the defendant achieves its anticompetitive ends fall
clearly within the deterrent objectives of section 4. The recognition of standing in such cases does not violate the core
Brunswick principle prohibiting recovery of damages from
competition itself, nor would it heighten the dangers of duplicative recovery, complex apportionment, or speculative damages that underlie many standing decisions, including AGCC
itself.
The recognition of antitrust standing for some nonconsumer and noncompetitor plaintiffs, but not for others, inevitably will present greater difficulties of application than a rule
of absolute exclusion. Yet courts are accustomed to dealing
with such questions in resolving questions of proximate cause.
There is no reason why they should be less able to do so in
cases involving the species of a statutory tort created by the
federal antitrust laws. A more restrictive reading of section 4
can result only from an activist assumption of judicial power to
rewrite and circumscribe the antitrust remedy that Congress
has provided, in violation of the Supreme Court's many recent
admonitions regarding the limits of the judicial role.

